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The status of international law in the U.S. legal system 
has been hotly contested.  Most international law scholars 
maintain that customary international law (CIL) is federal 
common law immediately applicable in federal courts.  A 
minority of scholars has responded that CIL may be applied by 
federal courts only when authorized by the political branches.  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124
S. Ct. 2739 (2004), stoked the debate.  In Sosa’s wake, scholars 
have overwhelmingly concluded that the Supreme Court 
endorsed the majority view that CIL is federal common law. 
 This Article asserts that Sosa has been both 
misperceived and underappreciated.  Sosa not only supports the 
minority position that federal judicial authority to incorporate 
CIL hinges on congressional intent, but Sosa startlingly suggests 
that federal incorporation is governed by the same 
considerations that determine whether treaties are self-executing 
and immediately applicable in U.S. courts: namely, the intent of 
the political branches, specific definition, mutuality, practical 
consequences, foreign relations effects, and alternative means of 
enforcement.  Sosa thus manifests the emergence of a uniform 
doctrine that governs the federal status of both treaties and CIL.  
This emerging doctrine, which serves to police the distribution of 
lawmaking and foreign affairs authority between the judiciary 
and the political branches, has significant implications.  It 
suggests that reigning confusion over the domestic status of 
international law is being replaced with doctrinal clarity and 
coherence, reveals that the collective wisdom on the domestic 
status of international law is out of step with Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, results in more appropriate treatment of CIL 
relative to treaties, and suggests that efforts to incorporate 
international law as federal law should focus on the political 
branches, not the courts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The status of international law in the U.S. legal system has long 
been murky.* Debate over the issue has reached feverish pitch in recent 
years.† Writers have clashed over such issues as whether customary 
 
* See Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain and the Future of International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts,
57 VAND. L. REV. 2241, 2243 (2004) (referring to the “decades-old battles over the 
constitutional status of international law”); Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over 
Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 367-68 (2002) (noting that the 
debate over the domestic status of customary international law was precipitated by the 
Supreme Court’s 1938 decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, as well as the increase 
in scope of, and litigation based on, international law in the latter 1900s) [hereinafter 
Young I]; see also Arthur M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International 
Cases, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (1995); Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the 
Preemptive Power of International Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295; Arthur M. Weisburd, 
The Executive Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1988); Phillip 
Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 665 
(1986). 
 † See Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional 
Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 153-54; Young I, supra note 
international law* (CIL) is federal or state law and whether CIL may be 
applied by federal courts absent incorporating legislation.†
Recently in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,‡ the Supreme Court stepped 
into the debate, commenting on the import of the Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS),§ a founding era jurisdictional statute that has been used to bring 
suits based on CIL in federal courts.** The Court concluded that federal 
 
*, at 366. 
* CIL is traditionally defined as the “general and consistent practice of states 
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT]; see also Statute of the International Court of Justice, Jun. 26, 1945, art. 
38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm (identifying “general [state] 
practice accepted as law” as a source of international law). 
† See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as 
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 816 (1997) 
(arguing that CIL is not federal common law and must be incorporated by the federal 
political branches before it may be applied as a federal rule of decision by federal courts) 
[hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, CIL as Federal Common Law]; Harold Hongju Koh, Is 
International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998) (defending the 
traditional position that CIL is federal law subject to common law incorporation by federal 
courts); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of 
International Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260 (1998); Curtis A. Bradley, The Status of 
Customary International Law in U.S. Courts–Before and After Erie, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. 
& POL’Y 807 (1998);  Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of 
International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997); Gerald L. 
Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
371 (1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as 
Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393 (1997); Ryan Goodman & Derek P. 
Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common Law,
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997); Young I, supra note *. 
‡ 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).  The facts of Sosa are discussed in conjunction with this 
Article’s analysis of Sosa’s reasoning.  See infra Part III. 
§ 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).  The ATS currently provides: “The district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”  Id. 
** While the ATS had largely gone unnoticed since its inclusion in the original 
Judiciary Act of 1789, the Second Circuit’s 1980 decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), brought the ATS out of obscurity and opened the door for federal 
courts to hear suits by aliens based on violations of CIL.  A variety of such suits were 
brought following Filartiga. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), 
vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), district court opinion 
vacated by 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 
2000); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 
232 (2d Cir. 1995); Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411 (9th Cir. 1995); In re Est. of 
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courts may recognize certain common law causes of action based on CIL 
under the ATS.†† In the wake of this decision, scholars have begun to 
discuss Sosa’s import for the status of CIL in federal courts.‡‡ However, 
scholars have failed to recognize what Sosa suggests about the status of 
international law more generally in federal courts. 
 
CIL is one of two primary sources of international law; treaties 
constitute the other.§§ In Sosa, the Supreme Court–without 
acknowledging it and perhaps unknowingly–started to close a circle the 
Court began to draw nearly 200 years ago when it adopted the self-
execution doctrine for treaties.  In Sosa, the Supreme Court suggested that 
whether treaties and CIL may be applied as rules of decision by federal 
courts is governed by the same doctrine–what might be called the implied 
incorporation doctrine.*** This Article identifies the emergence of this 
doctrine and discusses its implications. 
 
Part I provides context for this discussion by briefly recounting the 
debate regarding the domestic status of international law both prior to and 
following Sosa. As this Part reveals, the academic discussion of Sosa has 
failed to recognize the apparent emergence of a uniform approach to the 
federal status of treaties and CIL.  Part II provides the backdrop for 
perceiving this emerging doctrine by outlining the analysis courts employ 
to determine whether treaties may be invoked as rules of decision in U.S. 
courts.  Against this background, Part III analyzes the Court’s opinion in 
Sosa, identifying the test the Supreme Court developed for determining 
when CIL may be applied as federal law in federal courts.  Part IV renders 
explicit what Parts II and III suggest–that the same doctrine that governs 
the status of treaties also governs the status of CIL in federal courts.  Part 
IV identifies the substance of this doctrine of implied incorporation and 
provides a brief discussion of its implications, opening the door for 
scholarly debate on this emerging, and surely controversial, doctrine. 
 
Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994). 
†† Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761-62. 
‡‡ See infra Part I. 
§§ See RESTATEMENT, supra note *, § 102; Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, supra note *, at art. 38. 
*** The doctrine the Supreme Court suggested is uniform for treaties and CIL to the 
extent that CIL is domesticated based on implied congressional intent.  Whether CIL 
might also be domesticated on unique federal interest grounds is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  However, at least one commentator has argued that the wholesale incorporation 
of CIL as common law cannot be justified on federal interest grounds.  See Young I, supra 
note *, at 436-50. 
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I.  DEBATE OVER THE STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN FEDERAL 
COURTS 
As noted, the status of international law in the U.S. legal system, 
and particularly federal courts, has long been contested.  The debate has 
been somewhat less feverish with regard to treaties than with CIL.  The 
question whether treaties may be applied in U.S. courts as federal law has 
been relatively settled by the self-execution doctrine.††† However, this 
doctrine has been the subject of academic criticism.  Scholars have 
criticized the self-execution doctrine as inconsistent with treaties’ status as 
supreme federal law and have challenged the political branches’ practice 
of attaching non-self-executing declarations to U.S. ratification of 
treaties.‡‡‡ A minority of scholars has sought to defend the self-execution 
doctrine.§§§ 
By contrast, the status of CIL in federal courts has remained 
uncertain as a matter of doctrine.**** Broad references by the Supreme 
Court to international law’s domestic status have failed to supply clear 
 
††† See infra Part II.  This is not to suggest that the doctrine itself is clear, see Carlos 
Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695, 
695 (1995) [hereinafter Vazquez], but that the doctrine governs the questions whether and 
when treaties may be applied by U.S. courts as federal law.  If a treaty is found to be self-
executing, then it is immediately applicable by U.S. courts, whereas a non-self-executing 
treaty requires implementing legislation before courts may enforce the substance of its 
terms.  See infra note †††††††† and accompanying text.  
‡‡‡ See Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760, 760 (1988) 
(asserting that the self-execution doctrine “is a judicially invented notion that is patently 
inconsistent with” the Supremacy Clause); Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-Executing 
Treaties in the United States: A Critical Analysis, 26 VA. J. INT’L L. 627, 635 (1986); see 
also David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2002) (challenging the Restatement position on self-execution as 
inconsistent with the Constitution). 
§§§ See John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, 
and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999); John C. Yoo, Treaties 
and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999).  For responses to Professor Yoo’s position, see Martin S. 
Flaherty, History Right? Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and “Supreme 
Law of the Land”, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (1995); Carlos M. Vazquez, Laughing at 
Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1999). 
**** But cf. Koh, supra note †, at 1824-27, 1830-41 (arguing that federal court 
incorporation of CIL as federal common law has been the established practice at least 
since the U.S. founding). 
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guidance,†††† and lower courts have treated CIL as federal common law 
for some purposes but not others.‡‡‡‡ Scholars have likewise split on the 
issue. 
 
Prior to Sosa, the prevailing view was that CIL was applicable in 
federal courts as federal common law without a need for incorporation by 
the political branches.§§§§ Thus, Professor Koh argued that “[o]nce 
customary norms have sufficiently crystallized, courts should 
presumptively incorporate them into federal common law, unless the 
norms have been ousted as law for the United States by contrary federal 
directives.”***** This view was challenged, however, by a minority of 
scholars who claimed that CIL should not qualify as federal common law 
 
†††† See, for example, the famous statement in The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 
(1900), that “[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and 
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of 
right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”  Id. at 700.  For 
divergent views on the import of The Paquete Habana, compare Ku & Yoo, supra note †, 
at 172-73 (arguing that “if anything, [The Paquete Habana] undermine[s] the idea that 
federal courts have power to enforce CIL as federal law”); Young I, supra note *, at 451 
(noting, inter alia, that international law was part of general common law when The 
Paquete Habana was decided); Young II, supra note §§§§§, at 519 (same); Bradley & 
Goldsmith, CIL as Federal Common Law, supra note †, at 849-50 (same); John M. 
Rogers, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UNITED STATES LAW 135-39 (arguing “that 
international law is part of our law . . . in the same way that ‘justice’ or ‘fairness’ or 
‘sound policy’ is a part of our law”: “it forms the basis for decision when no other 
dispositive source controls”), and Koh, supra note †, at 1830-41 (citing The Paquete 
Habana to support the contention that “[b]oth before and after Erie, the federal courts 
issued rulings construing the law of nations.”).  See also Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Note, 
Rethinking Early Judicial Involvement in Foreign Affairs: An Empirical Study of the 
Supreme Court’s Docket, 114 YALE L. J. 855, 858-60, 865-66 (2005) (noting selective 
scholarly reliance on prior cases to support divergent views of the courts’ role in foreign 
affairs). 
‡‡‡‡ See Young I, supra note *, at 379, 381-84 (Although some courts have endorsed 
the view that CIL is federal common law for purposes of arising under jurisdiction, 
generally courts have not adopted the view that CIL trumps inconsistent state law as 
federal common law would.); Bradley & Goldsmith, CIL as Federal Common Law, supra 
note †, at 821, 845 & n.199, 851, 873 (“Although the lower federal courts have endorsed 
the [majority] position, they have done so mostly in jurisdictional contexts and have not 
generally considered its broader substantive implications”; for example, courts have 
generally not found that CIL binds the President, nor have they held that CIL is supreme 
over state law.). 
§§§§ Koh, supra note †, at 1824-26, 1835 & n.61, 1841; Bradley & Goldsmith, CIL 
as Federal Common Law, supra note †, at 816-17, 820; Young I, supra note *, at 366, 
375.  CIL as common law would trump state law and create arising under jurisdiction.  
See, e.g., Young I, supra note *, at 377-78. 
***** Koh, supra note †, at 1835. 
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post-Erie and thus could not provide a federal††††† rule of decision absent 
incorporation by the political branches.‡‡‡‡‡ The crux of the minority 
position was that the political branches must take the lead in rendering 
CIL domestic law.  While others views were advanced,§§§§§ these two 
framed the discussion.  Each raised persuasive arguments******; neither 
was the clear winner.†††††† 
Sosa provided additional fodder for the debate between the two 
positions.  In Sosa’s wake, commentators have tended to conclude that the 
Supreme Court has vindicated the majority position that federal courts 
possess the authority to incorporate CIL as federal common law even in 
the absence of congressional authorization.‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
††††† State incorporation of CIL would provide a state rule of decision for federal 
courts sitting in diversity.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, CIL as Federal Common Law, supra 
note †, at 870. 
‡‡‡‡‡ See id. at 817, 870; Koh, supra note †, at 1840 n.84; Young I, supra note *, at 
369, 463-64 & n.505 (summarizing, and collecting support for, the minority position). 
§§§§§ See, e.g., Young I, supra note *, at 370-71, 467-68, 511 (advocating a return to 
CIL’s pre-Erie status as general law that would make CIL available to both federal and 
state courts pursuant to conflict of law principles); Ernest A. Young, It’s Just Water: 
Toward the Normalization of Admiralty, 35 J. Mar. L. & Com. 469, 507-09 (2004) (same) 
[hereinafter Young II]; id. at 471, 517 (arguing that foreign affairs law ought to be 
normalized; i.e., that we should “[a]ccept broad legislative authority [in the area of foreign 
affairs], but insist that federal [foreign affairs] law be made according to constitutionally 
prescribed processes,” not through exceptional incorporation of CIL as federal common 
law); ROGERS, supra note ††††, at 139-68 (arguing that federal courts may apply CIL to 
preempt state law violations of international law where (a) there is no federal statute 
authorizing the violation, (b) the federal government would have power to legislate that 
the state comply with international law, and (c) the executive agrees, and the court 
confirms, that the relevant norm of CIL binds the U.S.). 
****** See Young I, supra note *, for one commentator’s assessment of the strengths 
and weaknesses of each position.  Young I concludes, inter alia, that the majority position 
is inconsistent with Erie, but that the minority view leaves too little room for the 
application of CIL in federal courts.  See id. at 372, 410-14, 462, 464-67, 510-11. 
†††††† See Ku & Yoo, supra note †, at 154 (noting “that neither side has convinced the 
other” and that “formalist arguments over the interpretation of the ATS” had reached a 
stalemate prior to Sosa). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡ See Anupam Chander, Globalization and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1193, 1205, 
1206 (2005) (Sosa “sided definitively with the” majority position and “represents a . . . 
catastrophe” for the minority view.); Martin S. Flaherty, The Future and Past of U.S. 
Foreign Relations Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 173 (2004) (Sosa’s “import is 
to confirm that international custom was part of judicially enforceable federal law even in 
the absence of a statute.”); Harold Hongju Koh, The 2004 Term: The Supreme Court 
Meets International Law, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 12-13 (2004) (All circuit 
courts, and now the Sosa Court, have rejected the minority position, though Sosa only 
recognized “a federal common law, civil remedy for a very limited class of gross human 
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Sosa’s significance, however, has been both misperceived and 
underappreciated.  Far from endorsing the majority view of CIL, the Court 
nodded support for the minority position by demonstrating that the 
application of CIL in federal courts turns on congressional intent.  More 
significantly for current purposes, the Court took this position in the 
course of making a broader statement about the status of international law 
in federal courts; that is, the Court not only reaffirmed the self-execution 
doctrine with regard to treaties, but also indicated that the substance of 
that doctrine governs the application of CIL in federal courts.§§§§§§ The 
Court thus set a trajectory toward the emergence of a uniform doctrine of 
 
rights violations.”); Ku & Yoo, supra note †, at 170, 199, 204, 206, 219 (Sosa endorsed 
the majority position on the federal courts’ authority to apply CIL.); see also Leila Nadya 
Sadat, An American Vision for Global Justice: Taking the Rule of (International) Law 
Seriously, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 329, 342 (2005); William S. Dodge, 
Bridging Erie: Customary International Law in the U.S. Legal System After Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 87, 88, 95, 100 (2004); Derek Jinks & 
David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV.
97, 104 n.27, 182 n.438 (2004); Gerald L. Neuman, The Abiding Significance of Law in 
Foreign Relations, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 111, 119 [hereinafter Neuman, Law in Foreign 
Relations]; Steinhardt, supra note *, at 2251, 2253-55, 2259, 2272; Beth Stephens, 
Corporate Liability Before and After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 995, 
1000 (2004); Beth Stephens, “The Door is Still Ajar” for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. 
Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 547-50, 556 (2004-05) [hereinafter Stephens II]; J. 
Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1694 
(2004); Ehren J. Brav, Recent Development, Opening the Courtroom Doors to Non-
Citizens: Cautiously Affirming Filartiga for the Alien Tort Statute, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
265, 266, 273-78 (2005); Note, The Offenses Clause After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 2378, 2383-85 (2005); Leading Cases: Federal Statutes and Regulations,
118 HARV. L. REV. 446, 451-53 (2004) [hereinafter Leading Cases].  But cf. Christiana 
Ochoa, Access to U.S. Federal Courts as a Forum for Human Rights Disputes: Pluralism 
and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 12 IND. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 631, 639, 648 (2005); Luisa 
Antoniolli, Taking Legal Pluralism Seriously: The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Role of 
International Law Before U.S. Federal Courts, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 651, 656, 
658 (2005); Eric A. Posner, Transnational Legal Process and the Supreme Court’s 2003-
2004 Term: Some Skeptical Observations, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 23, 28 (2004); 
Steinhardt, supra note *, at 2272-74; Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of 
International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492, 1528 (2004); Young II, supra note 
§§§§§, at 521. 
 Commentators have also lamented the number of questions Sosa leaves 
unresolved regarding the status of CIL.  See, e.g., Ku & Yoo, supra note †, at 176; 
Benjamin Berkowitz, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: United States Courts as Forums for 
Human Rights Cases and the New Incorporation Debate, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
289, 290 (2005); Leading Cases, supra, at 446, 451, 454. 
 This paper takes issue with both assessments: that Sosa tends to support the 
majority position and that Sosa failed to provide significant guidance on the status of CIL 
in domestic law. 
§§§§§§ Thus, in substance, the Court rejected prior assertions that “the self-executing 
treaty doctrine does not apply to [CIL].”  Paust, supra note ‡‡‡, at 782. 
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implied incorporation governing the application of both sources of 
international law in federal courts.  To perceive this broader point in Sosa,
one must understand in some detail the self-execution doctrine that courts 
use to determine whether treaties are immediately applicable as federal 
law.  Part II discusses the necessary contours of that doctrine. 
 
II.  TREATIES IN U.S. COURTS 
In contrast to CIL, treaties boast a prominent place in the 
Constitution.  Not only does Article II allocate the authority to make 
treaties,******* but the Supremacy Clause states that “all Treaties made or 
which shall be made under the Authority of the United States, shall[, like 
the Constitution and federal statutes,] be the supreme Law of the Land; 
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”††††††† 
On its face the Supremacy Clause suggests that treaties could and should 
be applied as U.S. law in U.S. courts whenever they are at issue.  
However, since early in U.S. history, the enforcement of treaties in U.S. 
courts has been limited by the doctrine of self-execution. 
 
In 1828, the Supreme Court in Foster v. Neilson explained that 
while the “[C]onstitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land” and 
therefore equivalent in status to federal statutes, not all treaties may be 
applied by U.S. courts.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Some treaties resemble contracts by which 
states agree to undertake certain acts.  The performance of these acts is 
entrusted “to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature 
must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.”§§§§§§§ 
As a result, only self-executing treaties provide domestic law enforceable 
in U.S. courts; non-self-executing treaties, while still binding on the 
United States internationally,******** require implementing legislation 
before their provisions may be judicially enforced.†††††††† When treaties 
 
******* U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (The President “shall have Power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators 
present concur.”). 
††††††† Id. at art. VI, cl. 2. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1828). 
§§§§§§§ Id.; see also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1988). 
******** See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note *, § 111 cmt. h, Rep.’s Note 5, § 321 & 
cmt. a; Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884); Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 
850 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Bradley & Goldsmith, CIL as Federal Common Law, supra note †, 
at 871. 
†††††††† See Foster, 27 U.S. at 314; see also Ogbudimka v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207, 218 
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are invoked as a rule of decision, then, courts must determine whether they 
are self-executing.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
Courts do not always make this determination explicitly or after 
significant analysis.§§§§§§§§ As a result, the content of self-execution 
analysis has not always been clear and requires extended discussion of 
several opinions.********* In those opinions the Supreme Court and several 
circuit courts have provided helpful guidance on how to determine 
whether a treaty is self-executing and immediately applicable in U.S. 
 
(3d Cir. 2003). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ But cf. Vazquez, supra note †††, at 716 & n.99 (noting that while “the lower 
courts in recent years have treated [an expansive, abstention-like version of] self-
execution as a threshold issue to be addressed in every treaty case,” the Supreme Court 
has resolved countless cases “without even mentioning the self-execution issue”); Paust, 
supra note ‡‡‡, at 772-73 & nn.83-90 (positing that two lines of Supreme Court cases 
exist with regard to self-execution: “one line . . . accepted the general distinction between 
self- and non-self-operative treaties, while the other seems simply to have ignored it”); 
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 158-59, 183, 187(1993) (obviating 
any need to address self-execution in concluding that the treaty invoked did not guarantee 
the right plaintiffs claimed); Maiorano v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 213 U.S. 268, 273-75 
(1909) (same); United States v. Lee Yan Tai, 185 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1902) (avoiding any 
need to address self-execution by concluding that a treaty and statute did not conflict and 
therefore did not raise any question of the treaty’s superseding effect). 
§§§§§§§§ For example, courts have repeatedly found, without conducting an express self-
execution analysis, that treaty provisions guaranteeing rights to aliens are enforceable.  
RESTATEMENT, supra note *, § 111 Rep.’s Note 5 (citing cases from the 1700s, 1800s, and 
1900s); see Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598.  To illustrate, the Supreme Court in 
Hauenstein v. Lynham, concluded that an 1850 treaty between the U.S. and Switzerland 
allowed a Swiss heir to recover the value of U.S. real estate owned by a deceased Swiss 
citizen notwithstanding any provision of Virginia law.  Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 
483 (1879).  In arriving at that conclusion the Supreme Court did not expressly ask 
whether the treaty was self-executing, although the Court did cite evidence that would 
support a conclusion that it was: namely, that the treaty clearly intended to create specific 
rights in alien heirs and explicitly contemplated adjudication by U.S. courts, albeit under 
U.S. law, if disputes arose among those claiming interests in U.S. property.  Id. at 486-88.  
Other cases that fail to engage in an explicit self-execution analysis could be cited.  See, 
e.g., Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 507-08, 517-18 (1947); Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 
47, 49-58 (1929); Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927); Asakura v. Seattle, 264 U.S. 
332, 340-41 (1924); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 539-43 (1884).  In other 
cases, the self-execution analysis is summary.  See, e.g., TWA, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.,
466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984); Fok Young Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296, 303 (1902); U.S. 
v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 419 (1886). 
********* See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (1979) (noting that “[t]he self-
execution question is perhaps one of the most confounding in treaty law” and, in practice, 
is difficult to answer); Vazquez, supra note †††, at 695, 722; Carlos Manuel Vazquez, 
Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1121 (1992) 
[hereinafter Vazquez II]. 
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courts. 
 
A.  Intent of the Political Branches 
Most importantly, the courts have indicated that whether a treaty is 
self-executing is a question of intent.††††††††† Whose intent–whether that 
of the parties to the treaty or that of the United States political branches–
has been a matter of debate.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Historically, the Restatement of the 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States suggested that the intent of the 
parties to the treaty governed.§§§§§§§§§ Over the years, courts have likewise 
invoked this rule.********** However, the trend has been to turn to the 
intent of the United States political branches.†††††††††† Even courts that 
have cited the parties’ intent as the governing guidepost have relied, in 
practice, on U.S. intent in analyzing self-execution.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
††††††††† Vazquez, supra note †††, at 704. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Id. at 704-08.  Compare, for example, Richardson, 555 F.2d at 851 (“In 
determining whether a treaty is self-executing courts look to the intent of the signatory 
parties . . . .”), with the Supreme Court opinions discussed in the text. 
§§§§§§§§§ See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 141 cmt. a (1965) (“Whether a particular treaty is self executing depends on the 
interpretation of the treaty under the rules stated in §§ 147 and 154.”) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]; id. § 147 (“International law requires that the interpretative 
process ascertain and give effect to the purpose of the international agreement which, as 
appears from the terms used by the parties, it was intended to serve.”); id. § 154 cmt. a 
(“[A]n international agreement may involve a commitment by the parties that its 
provisions will be effective under the domestic law of the parties at the time it goes into 
effect.  Under the law of the United States such an agreement would normally be 
interpreted as self-executing . . . .”). 
********** See Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373; Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 778 n.2 (Edwards, J., 
concurring); Diggs, 555 F.2d at 851.  But cf. Comm. of U.S. Citizens, 859 F.2d at 938 
(quoting Diggs for the proposition that the parties’ intent, as revealed by a treaty’s 
language, governs “‘whether a treaty is self-executing’ in the sense of its creating private 
enforcement rights”). 
†††††††††† See BARRY E. CARTER, PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE & CURTIS A. BRADLEY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 175 (4th ed. 2003) (“[I]t is arguable that, despite what courts have 
said, they end up looking primarily to the actual or likely intent of the U.S. treatymakers 
rather than to the intent of all the ratifying parties.”); Vazquez, supra note †††, at 705 
(“Lower courts in recent years . . . have sought to discern the intent not of the parties to 
the treaty, but of the U.S. negotiators of the treaty, the President in transmitting it to the 
Senate for its advice and consent, and the Senate in giving its advice and consent.”); id. at 
705 n.47 (collecting cases). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Cf. Frolova, 761 F.2d at 376 (citing President Ford’s statement that the Helsinki 
Accords were “‘neither a treaty nor . . . legally binding on any particular state’” as 
“forceful evidence that the parties did not intend the Accords to be self-executing”) 
(quoting 73 DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 204, 205 (1975)). 
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For example, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Postal explained 
that the self-execution analysis is an “attempt to discern the intent of the 
parties to the agreement so as to carry out their manifest purpose.”§§§§§§§§§§ 
Nonetheless, in conducting its analysis, the court repeatedly invoked the 
U.S.’s intent as the critical consideration. “[T]he question we must 
answer,” the court said, “is whether by ratifying the Convention on the 
High Seas the United States undertook to incorporate the restrictive 
language of Article 6 [of the Convention], which limits the permissible 
exercise of jurisdiction to those provided by treaty, into its domestic law 
and make it available in a criminal action as a defense to the jurisdiction of 
its courts.”*********** In answering this question, the court looked to such 
indications of U.S. intent as the U.S.’s failure to clearly manifest a 
unilateral desire to treat the agreement as self-executing when other parties 
to the agreement did not recognize self-executing agreements,††††††††††† 
substantial U.S. legislation and practice that would be automatically 
altered by a self-executing interpretation of Article 6 and no evidence of 
intent to effect such a sea change through ratification,‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ legislative 
testimony from the chairman of the U.S. treaty negotiation team and the 
State Department indicating that the treaty was non-self-
executing,§§§§§§§§§§§ and the presumed U.S. preference to enforce the treaty 
by foregoing prosecution of defendants seized in violation of Article 6 
only when the state of the defendants’ nationality protested the violation 
rather than whenever a violation technically occurred.************ Based on 
these considerations, the Fifth Circuit did “not believe that the United 
States intended to limit its traditionally asserted jurisdiction over foreign 
vessels on the High Seas by adopting article 6 of the High Seas 
Convention” and held that “[t]he determination of this intent must be the 
touchstone of our interpretation.”†††††††††††† Although the opinion had 
indicated early on that self-execution hinged on the parties’ intent, the 
court’s ultimate conclusion that Article 6 of the High Seas Convention 
was not self-executing was based on the intent of the United States.  Other 
circuit courts have likewise looked to evidence of the United States’ intent 
 
§§§§§§§§§§ Postal, 589 F.2d at 876. 
*********** Id. at 878. 
††††††††††† Id. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡Id. at 878-81. 
§§§§§§§§§§§ Id. at 881-83. 
************ Id. at 883-84. 
†††††††††††† Id. at 884. 
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in analyzing self-execution.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
Consistent with these decisions, the Restatement now explicitly 
takes the view that “the intention of the United States determines whether 
an agreement is to be self-executing . . . .”§§§§§§§§§§§§ This is so because 
“[i]n the absence of special agreement, it is ordinarily for the United States 
to decide how it will carry out [the] . . . international obligations” it has 
assumed.************* 
Although the Supreme Court has not been entirely uniform in its 
approach,††††††††††††† the Court appears to have favored U.S. intent as its 
guiding star as well.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ As early as the decision in Foster v. 
Neilson, which often is cited as the foundation for the self-execution 
doctrine,§§§§§§§§§§§§§ the Court turned to evidence from Congress to support 
 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ See Cornejo-Barreto, 379 F.3d at 1086-87 (relying on the Senate’s 
non-self-execution declaration and the executive’s analysis in concluding that the 
Convention Against Torture is not self-executing); In re Comm’r’s Subpoenas, 325 F.3d 
1287, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing statements by the President and State Department in 
concluding that a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with Canada was self-executing because 
it would be effectuated under existing legislation); Dutton, 37 Fed. Appx. at 53 (relying on 
the Senate’s non-self-execution declaration and the executive’s intent in proposing such a 
declaration in concluding that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is 
not self-executing). 
§§§§§§§§§§§§ RESTATEMENT, supra note *, § 111 cmt. h. 
************* Id. But cf. Vazquez, supra note †††, at 707-08 (criticizing the 
Restatement’s reasoning and conclusion that U.S. intent governs self-execution). 
††††††††††††† Cf. Clark, 340 U.S. 523, 526-28; id. at 531 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(majority and dissent concluding that a provision of the Shipowners’ Liability Convention 
was executed by general maritime law although evidence from the political branches 
indicated that implementing legislation was required); Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 
U.S. 150, 159 (1940) (quoting a provision of the General Inter-American Convention for 
Trade Mark and Commercial Protection that “the Convention ‘shall have the force of law 
in those States in which international treaties possess that character, as soon as they are 
ratified by their constitutional organs’” in concluding that the Convention was self-
executing); Fok Young Yo, 185 U.S. at 303 (arguably analyzing the parties’ implicit intent 
in finding that the treaty provision at issue was self-executing because, inter alia, it 
manifested assent to the continuance of applicable U.S. regulations). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ In addition to the opinions cited in text, see TWA, Inc., 466 U.S. at 276 
n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting, in a case where both the majority and the dissent 
found the Warsaw Convention to be self-executing, that the Solicitor General had taken 
that position as well); Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 738 (1943) (Stone, C.J., 
dissenting) (citing a letter to the President from the Secretary of State in concluding, 
consistent with that letter, see Warren v. U.S., 340 U.S. 523, 526 n.2 (1951), that part of 
the Shipowners’ Liability Convention was self-executing, while part was executory). 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§ See, e.g., Paust, supra note ‡‡‡, at 766-67 (asserting that the concept of 
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its self-execution analysis.************** In Foster, the plaintiff sought to 
recover property on the authority of a grant made by Spain.†††††††††††††† 
The defendant argued that the grant was invalid as it was made after Spain 
had ceded the land to France who in turn ceded it to the United 
States.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ A U.S.-Spain Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits 
provided that all grants made by Spain prior to a certain date and within 
territory since ceded to the United States “shall be ratified and confirmed 
to the persons in possession of the lands, to the same extent that the same 
grants would be valid if the territories had remained under the dominion 
of” Spain.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ This provision potentially resolved the 
dispute.*************** The Court, however, concluded that this provision 
was not self-executing and therefore could not be applied as a rule of 
decision.††††††††††††††† The Court based this conclusion, in large part, on 
the fact that the treaty provided that the Spanish grants “shall be ratified 
and confirmed,” rather than “shall be valid” or “are hereby confirmed,” 
and thus contemplated confirmation through legislative 
enactment.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ The Court bolstered its conclusion that the 
provision was not self-executing by inferring that Congress also 
understood the treaty to be executory and thus had established a means for 
confirming grants “embraced by the treaty” within territory not at issue in 
Foster.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ 
Interestingly, in the later case of United States v. Percheman, the 
Court was presented with the equally authoritative Spanish version of this 
same treaty, which provided that grants “shall remain ratified and 
confirmed.”**************** In light of this language, the Court switched 
tack and found the provision to be self-executing.†††††††††††††††† In so 
 
non-self-execution was “invented” in Foster). 
************** See Foster, 27 U.S. at 315-17. 
†††††††††††††† Id. at 299. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Id. at 299-300. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Id. at 310 (quoting U.S.-Spain treaty). 
*************** Id. at 310-14.  
††††††††††††††† Id. at 314. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Id. at 314-15. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Id. at 315.  Congress enacted no such statute for the territory in which 
the disputed land was located and thus left that territory subject to an earlier statute that 
annulled grants of land the title to which had been held by Spain at the time Spain 
arguably ceded the territory to France.  Id. at 300, 315-17. 
**************** United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88 (1833).  
†††††††††††††††† Id. at 88-89. 
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doing, one might argue that the Court disregarded the intent of Congress 
inferred in Foster. However, as in Foster, the Court in Percheman looked 
to the intent of the political branches to support its conclusion regarding 
the provision’s self-executing character.  Thus, the Court noted that “the 
United States could have [had] no motive” in insisting on implementing 
legislation where the law of nations would have secured prior Spanish 
grants even in the absence of the treaty with Spain.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ In both 
these early cases, then, the Court turned to U.S. intent to bolster its self-
execution analysis.  Since Foster and Percheman, the Court has given an 
even more prominent place to the intent of the political branches in the 
self-execution inquiry. 
 
In a 1913 case, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide 
whether a 1900 treaty–the treaty of Brussels–trumped a prior federal 
statute and extended the life of a patent issued under that 
statute.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Key to that question was whether the treaty was self-
executing.***************** In analyzing that issue the Supreme Court found 
that Congress’ enactment of legislation to carry the treaty into effect 
provided almost certain evidence of “the sense of Congress and those 
concerned with the treaty[--presumably the Secretaries of State and 
Interior†††††††††††††††††--]that it required legislation to become 
effective.”‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Moreover, the member of Congress in charge of 
the proposed implementing legislation said that the bill “was to carry [the 
treaty] into effect.”§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ The Court thus focused on the U.S.’s 
intent in analyzing self-execution.  That is not to say that the Court 
ignored the intent of the other parties to the treaty.  The Court relied on the 
fact that many of the other treaty parties had enacted, or intended to enact, 
legislation to effectuate the treaty, but did so to bolster its finding that the 
unequivocal “sense of Congress” was that the treaty required an 
implementing act.****************** 
The Supreme Court similarly focused on the intent of the political 
 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Id. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39, 41 (1913). 
***************** Id. at 44. 
††††††††††††††††† As the Supreme Court noted, the Secretary of the Interior had drafted a 
bill to implement the treaty and the Secretary of State had relied on that fact to assuage 
international concern about the United States’ lack of implementing legislation.  Id. at 49. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Id. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Id. at 49-50. 
****************** Id. at 50. 
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branches when, in 1933, it was called upon to decide whether the 
Prohibition-era Convention for the Prevention of Smuggling of 
Intoxicating Liquors (“Smuggling Convention”) between the U.S. and 
Britain trumped a prior provision of the U.S. Tariff Act.†††††††††††††††††† In 
determining that the Convention was self-executing, the Court relied on 
the following evidence of the political branches’ intent: a letter from the 
Secretary of State to the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs expressing that view, the Treasury Department’s issuance of 
amended instructions to the Coast Guard following ratification of the 
treaty that treaties of this type should be followed notwithstanding the 
Tariff Act, and the Solicitor General’s representation that the Coast Guard 
Commandant had been instructed to conduct seizures of British vessels 
consistent with the treaty.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Again, the intent of the political 
branches carried the day. 
 
Last term in Sosa, the Court again suggested that it is the U.S.’s 
intent that governs the self-execution question.  The plaintiff in Sosa 
argued that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), to which the United States is a party, created a private cause of 
action for arbitrary detention.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ The Court replied that the 
ICCPR could not itself create rights enforceable in federal courts because 
the Senate had ratified the ICCPR subject to a declaration that the 
ICCPR’s substantive terms were non-self-executing.******************* If the 
parties’ intent were the controlling inquiry, the Senate’s declaration may 
have been relevant to, but not determinative, of the issue.  As it was, the 
 
†††††††††††††††††† Cook, 288 U.S. at 107. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Id. at 119 & n.19; see also Maul v. U.S., 274 U.S. 501, 530 & n.39 
(1927) (citing Congress’ perception that implementing legislation was unnecessary and a 
communication from the Secretary of State in suggesting that a treaty was self-executing).  
The Cook Court’s conception of self-execution appears to have been slightly different than 
the traditional conception, perceiving self-execution as a precondition to executive, rather 
than judicial, action based on the treaty.  Id.; see also United States v. Best, 304 F.3d 308, 
314 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Cook for the proposition that “[w]hen a treaty is self-
executing, ‘no legislation [is] necessary to authorize executive action pursuant to its 
provisions.’”). 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2767. 
******************* Id. at 2763, 2767; see also Raffington, 399 F.3d at 903 (stating that the 
Convention Against Torture “[a]s ratified by the United States . . . is a non-self-executing 
treaty”); Cornejo-Barreto, 379 F.3d at 1086 (citing the Senate’s non-self-execution 
declaration as evidence that the Convention Against Torture is non-self-executing); 
Dutton, 37 Fed. Appx. at 53 (citing the Senate’s non-self-execution declaration as 
evidence that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is not self-
executing). 
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Supreme Court found the Senate’s declaration dispositive for self-
execution purposes.††††††††††††††††††† 
The touchstone of the self-execution analysis, then, appears to be 
the intent of the federal political branches.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Sometimes this 
intent will be obvious from the agreement itself.  In easy cases, an 
agreement will “expressly provide for legislative execution” of its 
provision, rendering the agreement executory,§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ or clearly 
stipulate that implementing legislation is not necessary as the treaty is self-
executing.******************** In the absence of contrary U.S. intent, courts 
 
††††††††††††††††††† Cf. Vazquez, supra note †††, at 706-07 (noting that “[i]f the intent of 
the U.S. treaty makers were dispositive, unilateral statements reflecting the views of the 
President and two-thirds of the Senate that the treaty is not self-executing would 
effectively make the treaty non-self-executing”). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ That the intent of the United States’ political branches is the relevant 
standard does not mean that the courts will simply defer to executive statements made in 
litigation regarding the nature of the treaty.  See Medellin, 2005 WL 1200824 (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting) (noting, in discussing whether Article 36 of the Vienna Convention created 
private rights, that the executive’s “understanding of our treaty obligations” deserves 
“considerable weight,” but “is not beyond debate”); RESTATEMENT, supra note *, § 111 
cmt. h, § 154(1) (Courts must decide the self-execution issue when it is presented in 
litigation.). 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Postal, 589 F.2d at 876-77 (citing provisions from the Convention on 
the High Seas that begin “‘Every State shall take the necessary legislative measures to . . 
.’” as examples of provisions that are expressly executory); see Aguilar, 318 U.S. 737-38 
& n.24 (Stone, C.J., dissenting); Fok Young Yo, 185 U.S. at 303, 305; Foster, 27 U.S. at 
314; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 630 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting); 
Tel-Oren, 726 f.2d at 809 (Bork, J., concurring); In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207, 1210 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005); Frolova, 761 F.2d at 376.  Cf. People of Saipan v. Dept. of Interior, 502 F.2d 
90, 96 & n.6, 103 n.7 (9th Cir. 1974).  But cf. Vazquez, supra note †††, at 709-10 (arguing 
that a treaty provision obliging states to take the necessary measures to ensure the treaty’s 
application should not render the treaty non-self-executing in the United States); Paust, 
supra note ‡‡‡, at 774 n.97 (same); TWA, Inc., 466 U.S. at 247, 252, 254 nn.25-26, 261, 
276 n.5. 
 Similarly, to the extent that a treaty “purports to do what is within the exclusive 
lawmaking power of Congress,” it is easy to conclude that the treaty was intended to be 
non-self-executing.  Vazquez, supra note †††, at 718; see RESTATEMENT, supra note *, § 
111(4)(c) & cmt. I; Paust, supra note ‡‡‡, at 777-82 (agreeing with this principle, but 
arguing that the war power is Congress’ only exclusive power).  Finally, if a treaty 
merely requires a state to refrain from acting, some have suggested that it is likely to be 
considered self-executing.  See RESTATEMENT, supra note *, § 111 Rep.’s Note 5; 
Commonwealth v. Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697, 702-03 (1878).  But see Vazquez, supra 
note †††, at 703 n.41. 
******************** See Bacardi Corp., 311 U.S. at 159 (quoting a provision of the General 
Inter-American Convention for Trade Mark and Commercial Protection that “the 
Convention ‘shall have the force of law in those States in which international treaties 
possess that character, as soon as they are ratified by their constitutional organs’” in 
An Emerging Uniformity 18
will likely follow the lead of these express provisions.  However, in many 
cases, intent will not be so obvious.   Other factors will bear on 
deciphering implied intent†††††††††††††††††††† and on the outcome of the self-
execution analysis.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
B.  Specific Definition 
The first such factor might be called specific definition.  Courts 
considering whether a treaty is self-executing often look to the language of 
the treaty§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ to determine whether it defines specific 
obligations that would be capable of judicial 
enforcement.********************* In Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist 
 
concluding that the Convention was self-executing).  Cf. Percheman, 32 U.S. at 88-89 
(concluding that a treaty provision was self-executing where the equally authoritative 
Spanish version provided that “grants ‘shall remain ratified and confirmed’” rather than 
“shall be ratified and confirmed” as had been supposed). 
 In both these situations, one might argue that it is the parties’ intent that is 
controlling.  Indeed, in the absence of evidence of contrary U.S. intent, the parties’ intent 
may be the best evidence of the U.S.’s intent.  Or, put differently, the parties’ intent 
controls to the extent it is consistent with U.S. intent.  The ultimate standard, however, is 
U.S. intent. 
†††††††††††††††††††† Cf. Vazquez, supra note †††, at 711 (arguing that courts’ consideration 
of these additional factors yields “a purely constructive [or imputed] intent (which is to 
say, not intent at all)”).  As noted below, whether these additional factors are perceived as 
tools for identifying congressional intent or judicial constructs for maintaining the proper 
allocation of authority between the political and judicial branches, they form, in 
connection with the focus on the political branches’ intent, a coherent separation of 
powers analysis.  See infra note §§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ and accompanying text. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Occasionally, courts cite a fairly standardized list of factors that may be 
considered in conducting a self-execution analysis: “(1) the language and purposes of the 
agreement as a whole; (2) the circumstances surrounding its execution; (3) the nature of 
the obligations imposed by the agreement; (4) the availability and feasability of alternative 
enforcement mechanisms; (5) the implications of permitting a private right of action; and 
(6) the capability of the judiciary to resolve the dispute.”  Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373; see 
People of Saipan, 502 F.2d at 97; Postal, 589 F.2d at 877; see also Richardson, 555 F.2d 
at 851.  The factors this paper identifies do not parrot this list, but seek to repackage the 
list to better reflect the issues courts actually consider in analyzing whether a treaty is 
immediately enforceable and to reveal similarities to the factors the Sosa Court imposed 
for applying CIL in federal courts. 
 §§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ See Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373 (going so far as to assert that “if the 
parties’ intent is clear from the treaty’s language courts will not inquire into [other] 
factors”). 
********************* See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 809 (Bork, J., concurring) (Articles 1 and 2 
of the U.N. Charter “contain general ‘purposes and principles,’ some of which state mere 
aspirations and none of which can be sensibly thought to have been intended to be 
judicially enforceable at the behest of individuals.”); Richardson, 555 F.2d at 851 (A U.N. 
An Emerging Uniformity 19
Republics, for example, the Seventh Circuit was required to decide 
whether U.N. Charter Articles 55 and 56 and the Helsinki Accords were 
self-executing.††††††††††††††††††††† Article 55 identifies goals, such as 
“higher standards of living” and “universal respect for . . . human rights,” 
that the United Nations will promote.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ In Article 56, U.N. 
member states “pledge . . . to take joint and separate action in cooperation 
with the [U.N.] for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 
55.”§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ The Court found these articles to be “phrased in 
broad generalities, suggesting that they are declarations of principles, not a 
code of legal rights.”********************** Their broad language did not 
“indicate[] an intent to prescribe ‘rules by which private rights may be 
determined,’ or to provide a means by which citizens of the signatory 
nations could enforce the lofty, but too often unrealized, principles 
expressed in the Charter.”†††††††††††††††††††††† The general language of 
these provisions thus undercut a finding that they were self-
executing.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
The court likewise found that the language of the Helsinki Accords 
rendered the Accords executory.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ While the relevant 
language of the Accords was more specific than that of the U.N. Charter, it 
was still “phrased in generalities.”*********************** In addition, it 
reaffirmed principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention and 
provided the signatory states with significant discretion that belied an 
intent to define specific, judicially enforceable rights.††††††††††††††††††††††† 
By contrast, the language of the U.S.-Japan treaty before the 
Supreme Court in Asakura v. Seattle was specific, detailed, and 
 
Security Council Resolution was not self-executing where it did not “confer rights upon 
individual citizens,” “provide specific standards,” or even establish standards typical of 
“conventional adjudication,” but rather called on governments to take action and invoked 
standards that were “rooted in diplomacy and its incidents.”); Vazquez, supra note †††, at 
712-15 (discussing courts’ consideration, in the self-execution context, of whether a treaty 
creates obligations or aspirations, and whether it provides determinate standards). 
††††††††††††††††††††† Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ U.N. Charter, art. 55. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Id. at art. 56. 
********************** See Frolova, 761 F.2d at 374. 
†††††††††††††††††††††† Id. (quoting Dreyfus, 534 F.2d at 30). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡Id. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Id. at 375-76. 
*********************** Id. at 375. 
††††††††††††††††††††††† See id. at 375-76. 
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imperative, guaranteeing that: 
 
[t]he citizens or subjects of each of the high contracting parties 
shall have liberty to enter, travel and reside in the territories of the 
other to carry on trade, wholesale or retail, to own or lease and 
occupy houses, manufactories, warehouses and shops, to employ 
agents of their choice, to lease land for residential and commercial 
purposes, and generally to do anything incident to or necessary for 
trade upon the same terms as native citizens or 
subjects.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
While the Supreme Court did not expressly discuss the quality of this 
language, or any other factor, in concluding that this provision was self-
executing and trumped a discriminatory municipal ordinance, the specific, 
detailed nature of the language certainly supported a finding of self-
execution.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ 
Similarly, Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas at issue in 
Postal v. United States “[o]n its face . . . [bore] a self-executing 
construction because it purport[ed] to” define the specific situations under 
which foreign states may and may not exercise jurisdiction over vessels on 
the high seas.************************ While the Fifth Circuit ultimately held 
 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Asakura, 265 U.S. at 340 (quoting U.S.-Japan Treaty, 37 Stat. 
1504, proclaimed Apr. 5, 1911). 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ See also TWA, Inc., 466 U.S. at 247, 252 (concluding that the 
Warsaw Convention is self-executing without specifically relying on the specific, detailed, 
and mandatory nature of the liability limits the Convention imposes for air carriers); 
Bacardi Corp., 311 U.S. at 158-61 (tersely concluding that the General Inter-American 
Convention for Trade Mark and Commercial Protection is self-executing after, among 
other things, quoting, but not expressly emphasizing, the specific, detailed, and imperative 
text of the Convention); Aguilar, 318 U.S. at 737-38 & n.24 (Stone, C.J., dissenting) 
(concluding, without specifically referring to the specific, detailed, and imperative nature 
of a provision of the Shipowners’ Liability Convention, that the provision was self-
executing); cf. Clark, 331 U.S. at 507-08, 514-15, 517 (quoting the specific, detailed, 
imperative language of U.S.-Germany treaty provisions guaranteeing rights to each states’ 
nationals in the course of concluding, without a self-execution analysis, that the 
provisions, if applicable, trumped California law); Nielsen, 279 U.S. at 50 (quoting the 
specific, detailed, and imperative language of a U.S.-Denmark treaty, guaranteeing equal 
treatment to aliens from the other state party, that the Court applied without specifically 
addressing the self-execution issue); Chew Heong, 112 U.S. at 542-43 (same with regard 
to a U.S.-China treaty guaranteeing equal treatment to Chinese aliens). 
************************ Postal, 589 F.2d at 877.  Article 6 provides, “Ships shall sail 
under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in 
international treaties or in these articles, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the 
high seas.”  Convention on the High Seas, art. 6, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2315. 
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that the context of Article 6 rendered it executory, the Article’s specificity 
pointed toward self-execution.†††††††††††††††††††††††† 
Article 6 of the Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese 
Mandated Islands likewise was found to be self-executing where the 
Agreement was a more detailed embodiment of the general and 
presumably‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ non-self-executing trusteeship provisions 
of the U.N. Charter.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ While “the substantive rights 
guaranteed through the . . . Agreement [were] not precisely defined,” they 
nonetheless “require[d] little legal or administrative innovation in the 
domestic fora” and were not “too vague for judicial enforcement,” 
particularly because there were other sources to which a court might look 
to give the rights content and because the Agreement was the 
constitutional document for the Trust Territory.************************* 
As these examples reflect, specific definition is a key consideration 
in the self-execution analysis.††††††††††††††††††††††††† Treaties that speak in 
terms of specific obligations are more likely to be found self-executing 
than treaties that embody more ethereal commitments. 
 
†††††††††††††††††††††††† Postal, 589 F.2d at 877-78. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ While the majority “assume[d] without deciding that” the 
relevant articles of the U.N. Charter did not “create affirmative and judicially enforceable 
obligations,” People of Saipan, 502 F.2d at 96-97, Judge Trask, concurring, thought it 
clear “that the Charter of the United Nations is not self-executing and does not in and of 
itself create rights which are justiciable between individual litigants,” id. at 100 (Trask, J., 
concurring). 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Id. at 96-97. 
************************* Id. at 97, 99.  The Ninth Circuit’s willingness to find the 
Trusteeship Agreement judicially enforceable without more specificity stretches of the 
concept of specific definition.  See id. at 103 & n.7 (Trask, J., concurring) (arguing that 
the language of the Trusteeship Agreement was insufficiently precise to be self-
executing).  The Ninth Circuit’s willingness seems justified, however, by the unique 
position of the Trusteeship Agreement.  The Agreement had been “codified into the law of 
the Trust Territory” by the Trust Territory government and was “the plaintiffs’ basic 
constitutional document.”  Id. at 98; see id. at 103 (Trask, J., concurring).  Judicial 
enforcement of constitutional texts routinely requires interpretation of rather vague terms.  
See id. at 99.  As a result, the court seemed more willing to find the Agreement judicially 
enforceable notwithstanding some lack of specificity.  See id. Had the Trusteeship 
Agreement been a stand-alone treaty that had not been codified as domestic constitutional 
law, greater specificity presumably would have been required to find the Agreement self-
executing. 
††††††††††††††††††††††††† See also Fok Young Yo, 185 U.S. at 303 (finding a treaty 
provision dealing with alien transit to be self-executing where it, among other things, 
“dealt with the subject specifically”). 
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C.  Mutuality 
A related consideration is mutuality.  In United States v. Postal, the 
Fifth Circuit indicated that when a treaty is multilateral and involves states 
parties who do not recognize self-executing treaties, greater evidence is 
required that the U.S. nonetheless intended the treaty be self-executing in 
its courts.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ The reason, it seems, is that when the U.S. 
enters treaties with states that do not permit self-execution, the U.S. may 
be offering a self-executing commitment in exchange for an executory 
promise, a skewed bargain that should not, as a rule, be 
presumed.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ The skewed bargain does not result 
merely because a treaty is multilateral, as multilateral treaties may only 
involve states in which treaties are or may be self-executing.  Thus, 
whether a treaty is bi- or multilateral is not determinative.  Nor does an 
 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Postal, 589 F.2d at 878.  But cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note *, 
§ 111 cmt h (“Whether an agreement is or is not self-executing in the law of another state 
party to the agreement is not controlling for the United States.”). 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ See Postal, 589 F.2d at 878, 882-83 (expressing concern for 
“mutuality” and “reciprocal obligations”).  The assumption that the commitments of states 
that do not recognize self-execution are less valuable has been criticized as a factual 
matter on two grounds.  First,  
 
in many (if not most) of such states there exists a cabinet form of 
government in which executive and legislative powers are merged.  In 
such situations, the government in power is in practice able to get the 
necessary parliamentary implementation almost as surely and as 
efficiently as if the agreement were self-executing.  In states where the 
ratification process requires general legislative approval, implementing 
legislation is introduced as a part of the ratification process. 
 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note §§§§§§§§§, § 154 Rep.’s Note 1.  Second, “whether 
or not a treaty or provision will be self-executing for a particular state party, and any lack 
of mutuality in this respect, have generally not been considerations when states enter into 
treaty obligations.”  RESTATEMENT, supra note *, § 111 Rep.’s Note 5. 
 The view that U.S. courts should be more reluctant to find a treaty self-
executing where it involves states that do not permit self-execution has also been 
criticized as a conceptual matter.  See id. (arguing that such a rule is misguided because 
self-execution facilitates U.S. compliance with its treaty obligations and because another 
state’s material default on its obligations would entitle the U.S. to terminate or suspend 
its obligations); Vazquez, supra note †††, at 704 (arguing that the Supremacy Clause 
does not prevent a treaty from being “‘self-executing’ in the United States even if it is 
‘non-self-executing’ for other nations” and that the parties to a treaty should be required 
to clearly state any “intent to alter [that] principle”).  Notwithstanding these criticisms, 
the concept of mutuality has played a role in the self-execution analysis of U.S. courts, 
supporting a finding of self-execution where mutuality of commitment exists. 
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unbalanced bargain arise in every instance involving a state that does not 
permit self-execution.  As the court in Postal recognized, a bilateral treaty 
with Britain, which typically does not recognize self-
execution,************************** could be self-executing in the U.S. where 
the treaty nonetheless involved “mutual rights and 
obligations.”†††††††††††††††††††††††††† Thus, the Smuggling Convention was 
self-executing where it secured for the U.S. authority to board British 
vessels outside U.S. territorial waters and provided British vessels the 
right to bring “liquor into the United States under seal in certain specified 
circumstances” as well as “a mechanism for settling claims” arising from 
the U.S.’s improper use of its treaty powers.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ At the 
heart of this consideration, then, is concern for mutuality of obligation.  A 
treaty is more likely to be found self-executing in the U.S. when other 
states parties have also accepted self-executing obligations. 
 
D.  Practical Consequences 
Likewise, a treaty is more likely to be found self-executing when 
such a finding would not trigger broad or untoward consequences.  The 
consequences of finding Article 6 of the High Seas Convention self-
executing led the Fifth Circuit in U.S. v. Postal to conclude that the U.S. 
did not intend such consequences to result from 
ratification.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Article 6 provides that ships on the high 
seas “shall be subject to [the] . . . exclusive jurisdiction” of the state under 
whose flag they sail, “save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in 
international treaties or in these articles.”*************************** As the 
Fifth Circuit recognized, the United States had, since inception, asserted 
jurisdiction on the high seas beyond the limits imposed by Article 
 
************************** Postal, 589 F.2d at 878 n.24; Vazquez, supra note †††, at 697 
& n.12. 
†††††††††††††††††††††††††† Postal, 589 F.2d at 882. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Id. at 882-883. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Id. at 878-81; see also Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 810 (Bork, J., 
concurring) (concluding that the Hague Conventions on the Laws of War were non-self-
executing and not available to private plaintiffs, as a contrary finding “could create 
perhaps hundreds of thousands or millions of lawsuits by” victims of “large-scale war” 
that might overreach “the capacity of any legal system” and present “an obstacle to the 
negotiation of peace and the resumption of normal relations between nations”); cf. Sale,
509 U.S. at 177 (reasoning that the United States did not silently assume an obligation to 
aliens outside its borders in ratifying the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees given the broad consequences of assuming such an obligation). 
*************************** Postal, 589 F.2d at 869 (quoting Convention on the High Seas, 
supra note §§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§, art. 6.). 
An Emerging Uniformity 24
6.††††††††††††††††††††††††††† In 1790, the United States enacted a statute that 
authorized the boarding of foreign vessels outside U.S. territorial waters 
but within 12 miles of the U.S. coast.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ This statute, 
upheld by the Supreme Court, spawned similar succeeding statutes that 
have continued to the present and that have also been reviewed by U.S. 
courts.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Other statutes, both preceding and 
succeeding the High Seas Convention, have authorized U.S. jurisdiction 
even beyond 12 miles for certain purposes.**************************** 
Recognizing Article 6 as self-executing would invalidate all these statutes 
to the extent they conflicted with Article 6 and were enacted before the 
Convention was ratified.†††††††††††††††††††††††††††† The consequences of 
finding Article 6 to be self-executing were therefore broad and 
inconsistent with historical and modern U.S. 
policy.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
Had the consequences been more narrow, as was the case with the 
Smuggling Convention which affected “the jurisdiction of the United 
States only [with regard to] . . . seizures of British vessels engaged in 
smuggling liquor,” the court may have reached a different result, as it did 
with the Smuggling Convention.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ As it was, Article 
6 of the High Seas Convention amounted to “a sweeping prohibition on 
the exercise of jurisdiction against foreign vessels on the high 
seas,”***************************** and the court found Article 6 to be non-self-
executing.††††††††††††††††††††††††††††† 
††††††††††††††††††††††††††† Id. at 879.  To be sure, Article 6 would permit some, but not 
all, of the control the U.S. has exerted outside its territorial waters.  See id. at 880-81 & 
n.30. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Id. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Id. at 879-80 & nn.28-29; see 19 U.S.C. §§ 1401(j), 1709(c) 
(1999); 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (1999); 19 U.S.C. § 1586 (1999). 
**************************** Id. at 880 & n.30. 
†††††††††††††††††††††††††††† See id. at 878 & n.25. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ See id. at 880-81 & n.30, 883. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Id. at 883. 
***************************** Id. 
††††††††††††††††††††††††††††† See id. at 880-82.  By contrast, the fact that the treaty 
provision at issue in People of Saipan dealt with “the local economy and environment, not 
[the more sensitive, far-reaching, not to mention discretionary, issue of] security” 
supported a finding that the provision was self-executing.  People of Saipan, 502 F.2d at 
97; see id. at 96 (noting the Trusteeship Agreement’s broad grant of discretion to the 
United States with regard to military activity in the trust territory). 
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E.  Foreign Relations Effects 
While the practical consequences of self-execution may be varied, 
one consequence has played a particular role in self-execution analysis: 
the foreign affairs effects of self-execution.  Relevant effects include the 
impact on relations with other states, on the political branch’s discretion to 
conduct foreign affairs, and on the distribution of authority to conduct 
foreign affairs.  The relevance of the first effect–the impact on relations 
with other states–is illustrated in Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics as well as in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Asakura v. Seattle.
In Frolova, the plaintiff, a U.S. citizen, argued that Articles 55 and 56 of 
the U.N. Charter as well as the Helsinki Accords were self-executing and 
prevented the Soviet Union from claiming sovereign immunity in 
plaintiff’s damage suit arising from the Soviet Union’s failure to permit 
her husband, a Soviet citizen, to emigrate to the United 
States.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ The Soviet Union had twice refused the 
husband’s emigration application due to “‘bad relations with the United 
States’” and because his “departure was ‘not in the interest of the Soviet 
State.’”§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ In deciding whether Articles 55 and 56 
and the Helsinki Accords were self-executing, the Seventh Circuit noted 
that “judicial resolution of cases bearing significantly on sensitive foreign 
policy matters . . . might have serious foreign policy implications which 
courts are ill-equipped to anticipate and handle.”* Frolova was just such a 
case.† “Soviet emigration policies [had] been the subject of a long-
running battle between American policymakers and the Kremlin, often 
generating conflict between the White House and Congress.  Judicial 
intervention into [a case involving this] delicate political issue would be 
ill-advised and could have unforeseen consequences for American-Soviet 
relations.”‡ As a result, the court declined to find Articles 55 and 56 or the 
Helsinki Accords self-executing and privately enforceable.§
This is not to suggest that any impact on foreign affairs renders a 
treaty executory in U.S. courts.  In Asakura, the Supreme Court noted that 
 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Frolova, 761 F.2d at 371, 373.  
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Id. at 371. 
* Id. at 375. 
† Id. 
‡ Id. 
§ See id. The result was that plaintiff had to resort to “diplomatic channels and the 
court of world opinion,” rather than U.S. courts, if she wished to pursue her claim.  Id.; see 
also id. at 376. 
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“[t]reaties for the protection of citizens of one country residing in the 
territory of another are common and make for good understanding 
between nations”; indeed, the treaty the U.S. and Japan entered along 
these lines “was made to strengthen friendly relations between [them].”** 
The Court thus suggested that the foreign affairs benefits of these treaties 
supports finding them self-executing, at least when the self-executing 
nature of the treaty is otherwise clear and when the self-execution issue is 
forced by state or local legislation that undercuts the treaties’ foreign 
affairs benefits.†† 
The foreign affairs benefits of self-execution may also justify such 
a finding when self-execution would both improve relations with other 
states and, consistent with the second foreign affairs concern courts 
consider, not unduly infringe on U.S. discretion to conduct foreign affairs.  
To illustrate, the court in Postal noted that the United States entered the 
Smuggling Convention with Great Britain to validate seizures of foreign 
vessels outside U.S. territorial waters, but also “to avoid the repeated [and 
inevitable] protests that the British . . . lodged against . . . seizures” of 
British vessels outside those waters.‡‡ Absent these protests, U.S. law, 
under the doctrine of Ker v. Illinois,§§ might have sanctioned U.S. 
jurisdiction over defendants so seized even if a treaty violation technically 
had occurred.*** As a result, the United States would retain foreign affairs 
discretion whether to seize British vessels.  However, where British 
objection appeared inevitable and where objection raised the possibility 
that U.S. law would not permit jurisdiction resulting from seizures in 
violation of a treaty, finding the Smuggling Convention to be self-
 
** Asakura, 265 U.S. at 341. 
†† See id. at 339-40.  Cf. Chew Heong, 112 U.S. at 540 (suggesting that concern for 
the U.S.’s reputation for treaty compliance supports a presumption that federal legislation 
was not intended to abrogate a treaty). 
‡‡ Postal, 589 F.2d at 883. 
§§ 119 U.S. 436 (1886).  Ker, together with the decision in Frisbie v. Collins, 342 
U.S. 519 (1952), established the rule that unlawful seizure of a defendant ordinarily does 
not affect the court’s authority to try the defendant; however, an exception to the rule has 
been recognized where the seizure occurs in violation of a self-executing treaty.  See, e.g.,
United States v. Best, 304 F.3d 308, 311-14 (3d Cir. 2002). 
*** Postal, 589 F.2d at 883; see RESTATEMENT, supra note *, § 432 cmt. c (If a state 
abducts a person in the territory of another state without consent, and “[i]f the state from 
which the person was abducted does not demand his return, under the prevailing view the 
abducting state may proceed to prosecute him under its laws.”).  More recently, the 
Supreme Court has said that “it would appear that a court must enforce [a self-executing 
treaty] on behalf of an individual regardless of the offensiveness of the practice of one 
nation to the other nation.”  U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992). 
An Emerging Uniformity 27
executing both improved U.S. foreign relations with Great Britain and did 
not limit the political branches’ foreign affairs discretion more than U.S. 
law might have.††† Both the concern for relations with other states and the 
concern over limiting the U.S.’s foreign affairs discretion permitted a 
finding that the Smuggling Convention was self-executing. 
 
In contrast to Britain’s inevitable protest of U.S. seizures outside 
territorial waters, the court noted that some states might not object to U.S. 
seizures in violation of Article 6 of the High Seas Convention.‡‡‡ Indeed, 
the record in Postal disclosed no protest from the Grand Cayman Islands 
over the high-seas seizure of a vessel registered in the Islands that was 
transporting multiple tons of marijuana.§§§ Finding Article 6 to be 
executory would allow the U.S. to engage in seizures in such situations 
(where seizure would not sour foreign relations), whereas a conclusion 
that Article 6 was self-executing would automatically divest the U.S. of 
jurisdiction to conduct the seizure and resulting prosecution even in the 
absence of a protest.**** Preserving the U.S.’s discretion to engage in non-
controversial seizures in violation of Article 6 led the court to find Article 
6 executory.†††† 
In addition to preserving foreign affairs discretion and maintaining 
positive relations with other states, at least one other foreign affairs 
concern influences courts’ self-execution analysis: the concern for the 
distribution of foreign affairs authority.  The D.C. Circuit, for example, 
concluded that a U.N. Security Council resolution, which restricted states’ 
interactions with South Africa due to its occupation of Namibia, was 
executory in part because the terms of the resolution dealt “with the 
conduct of our foreign relations, an area traditionally left to the executive 
branch.”‡‡‡‡ To the extent that enforcement of a treaty would lead the 
courts to overstep the proper distribution of authority between the 
judiciary and political branches, a court is more likely to find the treaty 
executory. 
 
F.  Alternative Enforcement Mechanisms 
††† See Postal, 589 F.2d at 883. 
‡‡‡ Id. at 883-84. 
§§§ Id. at 884-85; see id. at 865-68, 872. 
**** Id. at 884. 
†††† See id. 
‡‡‡‡ Richardson, 555 F.2d at 851. 
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Finally, several courts have mentioned “the availability and 
feasability of alternative enforcement mechanisms” as a factor to consider 
in self-execution analysis.§§§§ Typically, this factor has received little 
consideration.  In People of Saipan, the Ninth Circuit noted in passing that 
the plaintiffs’ alternative forum for pressing their treaty claim against the 
United States–the Security Council–“would present to the plaintiffs 
obstacles so great as to make their [treaty] rights virtually 
unenforceable.”***** Because the court “refuse[d] to leave the plaintiffs 
without a forum which [could] hear their” claim, the absence of adequate 
alternative means of enforcing the treaty supported a finding of self-
execution.††††† By contrast, the availability of viable alternative 
enforcement would tend to render a treaty executory. 
 
In sum, in determining whether a treaty is self-executing and 
therefore applicable in the absence of implementing legislation, U.S. 
courts consider the intent of the political branches, specific definition, 
mutuality, practical consequences, foreign relations effects, and alternative 
means of enforcement.  If these factors point toward a finding of self-
execution, courts take the lead in applying a treaty as U.S. law.  If, instead, 
a treaty is non-self-executing, courts must wait for Congress to render the 
treaty enforceable through implementing legislation.  As a result, some, 
but not all, treaties are immediately enforceable in U.S. courts. 
 
III.  THE SUPREME COURT’S TREATMENT OF CIL IN SOSA 
In contrast to this variable approach to judicial enforcement of 
treaties, the scholarly majority has maintained that CIL is automatically 
enforceable in federal courts as federal common law.  As noted, this view 
has been contested by a minority of scholars who believe that the political 
branches must take the lead in incorporating CIL.  As noted, the Supreme 
Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain waded into this debate, providing 
guidance on CIL’s status in federal courts.  The guidance provided bears a 
striking resemblance to the analysis, just discussed, that U.S. courts use to 
determine whether treaties are judicially enforceable.  The result of this 
confluence is the apparent emergence of a unified, but as yet unnoticed, 
doctrine governing whether treaties and CIL may be applied by federal 
courts absent implementing legislation from Congress.  The relief of this 
 
§§§§ Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373; People of Saipan, 502 F.2d at 97; Postal, 589 F.2d at 
877 (quoting People of Saipan). 
***** People of Saipan, 502 F.2d at 97-98.  
††††† Id. at 100. 
An Emerging Uniformity 29
doctrine becomes visible as this section charts the analysis of Sosa against 
the background of the self-execution analysis outlined above. 
 
In Sosa, the Supreme Court was faced with the cross-border 
abduction of Mexican citizen Humberto Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez).‡‡‡‡‡ 
The abduction, approved by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in 
order to bring Alvarez to trial in the U.S. for his alleged role in the murder 
of a DEA agent in Mexico, was effected by Jose Francisco Sosa, also a 
Mexican citizen, who kidnaped Alvarez in Mexico and delivered him to 
federal authorities in Texas.§§§§§ After Alvarez was tried and acquitted in 
the U.S., he returned to Mexico and brought suit against Sosa in U.S. 
district court under the Alien Tort Statute to recover for Sosa’s alleged 
violation of the law of nations.****** The lower courts granted and upheld 
a damage award on Alvarez’s ATS claim, the Ninth Circuit asserting “that 
[the ATS] not only provides federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction, 
but also creates a cause of action for an alleged violation of the law of 
nations.”†††††† The accuracy of this assertion was at the heart of the ATS 
case before the Supreme Court.‡‡‡‡‡‡ The Supreme Court ultimately 
agreed with Sosa and the government that the ATS was a jurisdictional 
statute only.§§§§§§ However, this conclusion opened the door for the Court 
to consider another question: whether federal courts nonetheless had 
authority to recognize causes of action based on CIL.******* 
A.  Intent of Congress 
The Supreme Court answered this question by explaining that, as a 
general rule, federal courts’ authority to recognize causes of action based 
on CIL turns on congressional intent.  Historically, CIL was treated as 
general common law,††††††† part of the brooding omnipresence‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
‡‡‡‡‡ Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2746. 
§§§§§ Id. 
****** Id. at 2746-47. 
†††††† Id. at 2747 (quoting Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 612 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (en banc)). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡ Id. at 2754.  The appeal to the Supreme Court also raised and resolved a Federal 
Tort Claims Act issue that is not material to the subject of this paper.  Id. at 2746-54. 
§§§§§§ Id. at 2754, 2761.  Cf. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 810, 812 (Bork, J., concurring) 
(concluding that the ATS “is merely a jurisdiction-granting statute and not the 
implementing legislation required by non-self-executing treaties to enable individuals to 
enforce their provisions”). 
******* Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2755. 
††††††† See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2770 (Scalia, J., concurring in part); Young I, supra note 
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equally discoverable by federal and state courts and derivative of neither 
authority.§§§§§§§ As a result, in the pre-Erie era in which the ATS was 
enacted, federal courts were free to recognize causes of action based on 
CIL, and the ATS assured that they had jurisdiction to hear those 
claims.******** Today, federal courts’ authority is significantly different. 
 
As the Court explained (in a primer on post-Erie federal common 
law), “the prevailing conception of the common law has changed since 
1789 in a way that counsels restraint in judicially applying internationally 
generated norms.”†††††††† Today it is clear that common law “is not so 
much found or discovered as it is either made or created.”‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ In part 
as a result of this new understanding of the nature of common law, the 
authority of federal courts to create common law, and to apply CIL as 
common law, is fundamentally different than it once was.§§§§§§§§ Now, 
although there exist “limited enclaves in which federal” common law may 
be made,********* “the general practice . . . [is] to look for legislative 
guidance before exercising innovative authority over substantive 
 
*, at 374 & n.43, 393-94 & n.143 (collecting and discussing authorities). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
§§§§§§§ See Ku & Yoo, supra note †, at 202 (“Prior to the seminal case of Erie, most 
scholars agree that CIL formed part of the general common law” and, as a result, neither 
state nor federal courts were bound by the interpretations of the other.); Dodge, supra note 
‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 89 & n.14 (“There is widespread agreement that, when the Constitution was 
adopted and the First Judiciary Act was passed, the law of nations was understood to be 
general common law, which was binding on both federal and state courts.”) (footnote 
omitted); Leading Cases, supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 451 (“In 1789, the law of nations clearly 
was considered part of the general common law, that ‘brooding omnipresence’ recognized 
rather than created by federal and state judges alike.”) (footnote omitted); Bradley & 
Goldsmith, CIL as Federal Common Law, supra note †, at 823-24, 852 (Prior to Erie, CIL 
was part of the transcendental general common law “that did not emanate from a 
particular sovereign authority” and that was applied independently by state and federal 
courts.); Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2770 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (“[T]he general common 
law was neither” state nor federal law.); Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown 
& Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
the notion undergirding the general common law that there exists “a transcendental body 
of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by 
statute”). 
******** Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761; see also Ku & Yoo, supra note †, at 202. 
†††††††† Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2762. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Id. 
§§§§§§§§ Id. 
********* Id. at 2764; see also id. at 2761, 2764-65 & n.18 (noting that CIL is not 
“categorically precluded” from incorporation as federal common law).  
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law.”††††††††† This rule has been repeatedly recognized in the context of 
fashioning common law causes of action.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ In that context, the rule 
serves to ensure that important policy decisions, such as the proper means 
of enforcing a law regulating primary conduct, are left to the 
legislature.§§§§§§§§§ More generally, the rule serves to preserve a 
separation of powers in which Congress retains principal lawmaking 
authority within the federal government. 
 
The Court made clear that this general rule applies even when the 
common law cause of action to be created is based on CIL as evidenced by 
its focus on whether the legislature had authorized federal courts to create 
common law causes of action to be heard pursuant to ATS jurisdiction.  
Had the Court believed that the federal judiciary possessed unlimited 
authority to incorporate CIL into domestic law, this focus on 
congressional authorization would have been unnecessary.  The Court 
simply could have stated that federal courts (a) have common law 
authority to create causes of action based on CIL and (b) jurisdiction to 
hear such claims under either the ATS (on the theory that the scope of 
ATS jurisdiction did not change merely because federal courts now 
incorporate CIL as federal common law rather than as general common 
law)********** or the general federal question statute.†††††††††† Indeed, 
Justice Scalia explicitly suggested that the general federal question statute 
would work as well as the ATS not only as a basis for jurisdiction,‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
††††††††† Id. at 2762; see also id. at 2774 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Id. at 2762-63.  Cf. Stephens, supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 999 (reasoning that “[i]f the 
Supreme Court considered the [ATS] as if it were enacted today, the Court would likely 
hold that it” creates jurisdiction but not a cause of action as “[t]he Court today does not 
infer causes of action, but rather requires Congress to give specific authorization for such 
claims”). 
§§§§§§§§§ Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2763. 
********** Cf. Leading Cases, supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 453-54 (Sosa provided some support 
for the view that CIL was “not necessarily incorporated within post-Erie federal common 
law,” but courts retain CIL “lawmaking authority because the process of ‘recognizing’ 
(rather than creating) federal general common law before Erie was the same as the process 
of ‘recognizing’ norms of [CIL] since then.”). 
†††††††††† See Bradley & Goldsmith, CIL as Federal Common Law, supra note †, at 847-
48 & nn.210-11; RESTATEMENT, supra note *, § 111(2); Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2773 n.* 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2773 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring in part); see also Stephens II, 
supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 542 (recognizing that if CIL is federal law, the general federal 
question statute would provide jurisdiction for CIL claims, rendering the ATS 
unnecessary).  The Sosa majority apparently did not respond to Justice Scalia’s assertion 
that section 1331, the general federal question statute, would be an equally good fount of 
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but also for the creation of common law based on CIL, if there were 
“some [post-Erie] residual power . . . to create federal causes of action in 
cases implicating foreign affairs.”§§§§§§§§§§ But the Court rejected the 
suggestion that federal courts may incorporate CIL under the general 
federal question statute and explained that the federal courts’ authority to 
create new causes of action based on CIL derived from Congress’ unique 
intent in enacting the ATS.*********** This unique intent was discerned 
through an extensive analysis of the motives of both the first and 
subsequent Congresses.††††††††††† 
The first Congress included the ATS within the Judiciary Act of 
 
jurisdiction for common-law causes of action created under the congressional 
authorization implied from the ATS.  Compare Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2773 n.* (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part), with id. at 2765 n.19.  Although Professor Dodge has suggested that 
the majority did hold that section 1331 would not provide jurisdiction for CIL-based 
causes of action, that conclusion seems to have resulted from conflation of two questions: 
(a) whether the general federal question statute authorized the creation of CIL-based 
common law (to which the majority responded in the negative as there was no indication 
of congressional intent to authorize such power pursuant to section 1331), and (b) whether 
the general federal question statute can provide jurisdiction for common-law causes of 
action authorized by Congress’ intent behind the ATS (which the majority seemed to 
ignore).  See id.; Dodge, supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 96-97.  This conflation leads to Professor 
Dodge’s novel suggestion that CIL “may be federal common law for purposes of the ATS, 
but not for the purposes of [section] 1331.”  Dodge, supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 97; see also id. 
at 100.  Understanding the majority’s focus on congressional intent as the source of 
authority to create CIL-based common law prevents the need to recognize such a unique 
form of federal common law. 
§§§§§§§§§§ Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2773 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring in part). 
*********** Id. at 2765 n.19; see Swaine, supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 1528 (Sosa’s holding was 
based on congressional delegation to the federal courts of “modest authority to reckon 
[CIL].”).  Cf. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 812 (Bork., J., concurring) (suggesting that, had 
Congress so intended, the ATS could “authorize tort suits for the vindication of any 
international legal right”).  Thus, although the Court recognized that in Erie’s wake there 
are “limited enclaves” of acceptable federal common law making and that Supreme Court 
precedent treating international law as part of U.S. law does not “preclude” federal courts 
from ever recognizing as federal common law “international norms intended to protect 
individuals,” Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2764-65 & n.18; see also id. at 2761, the Court did not 
suggest that federal courts have independent authority to incorporate CIL as common law.  
Rather, the Court indicated that the authority to engage in such common law making 
derives, as a rule, from Congress.  
The Court’s reliance on the unique intent behind the ATS does, however, raise 
questions about when a jurisdictional grant may evidence an intent to confer common law 
making authority.  See Leading Cases, supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 455-56. 
††††††††††† See Stephens II, supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 544 (“The Supreme Court resolved the 
debate [regarding the ATS’ import] by working carefully through the available 
information about the intent of those who enacted the statute.”); id. at 549. 
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1789.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ As originally enacted, the ATS provided federal district 
courts “cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the 
circuit courts, . . . of all the causes where an alien sues for a tort only in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”§§§§§§§§§§§ 
The ATS’s inclusion in the Judiciary Act which otherwise exclusively 
addressed federal jurisdiction; the use of the term “cognizance” which 
“bespoke a grant of jurisdiction, not power to mold substantive law”; and 
the fact that the first Congress would have been aware of “the distinction 
between jurisdiction and a cause of action” all led to the easy conclusion 
that the ATS “was intended as jurisdictional.”************ 
That conclusion did not preclude an implied intent that federal 
courts recognize causes of action based on CIL, however.†††††††††††† The 
Court therefore turned to assessing whether Congress impliedly authorized 
federal courts to create common law causes of action based on 
CIL.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ The history surrounding the ATS was sparse and 
equivocal, but permitted the Court to draw two inferences regarding 
Congress’ intent.§§§§§§§§§§§§ First, Congress did not intend the ATS to lie 
fallow until some future Congress or state provided or authorized the 
creation of a cause of action that could be heard pursuant to the ATS’s 
jurisdictional grant.************* Second, “Congress intended the ATS to 
furnish jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of [common law] actions 
alleging violations of the law of nations.”††††††††††††† 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2755. 
§§§§§§§§§§§ Id. (quoting Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 79). 
************ Id. Cf. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 810 (Bork, J., concurring). 
†††††††††††† This is where the majority and Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas) part company.  While the majority believed that the 
implied intent of the first and subsequent Congresses empowered federal courts to 
recognize new, though limited, causes of action based on CIL consistent with post-Erie 
federal common law making, Justice Scalia believed that Erie precluded a finding that the 
first Congress authorized federal courts to create federal common law now that general 
common law is extinct.  Id. at 2761, 2764-65; id. at 2773-74 (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part).  Cf. Dodge, supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 95-96. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2755. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§ See id. at 2758 (noting that “[t]here is no record of congressional 
discussion about private actions that might be subject to” ATS jurisdiction “or about any 
need for further legislation to create private remedies,” and that scholarly debate has 
yielded no “consensus understanding of what Congress intended”). 
************* Id. at 2758-59; see also id. at 2761. 
††††††††††††† Id. at 2759; see id. at 2761.  The historical evidence supporting these 
inferences included the following: (a) at the time the ATS was enacted, the law of nations 
recognized three offenses that could be judicially enforced against individuals–“violation 
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The first Congress’ intent that federal courts recognize a limited 
number of common law causes of action based on the law of nations was 
easy to achieve at the time the ATS was enacted, as federal courts could 
legitimately apply CIL as general federal common law.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ As 
previously noted, in light of Erie, federal courts no longer enjoy that 
authority.§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Erie’s restriction of federal judicial authority, 
however, did not defeat the first Congress’ intent.************** The Court 
concluded that that intent continued to provide authority for limited 
recognition of CIL-based common law, particularly given the intent of 
more recent Congresses.†††††††††††††† 
of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy”–which were 
probably what the ATS drafters had in mind when they referred to suits by aliens for torts 
in violation of the law of nations, id. at 2756; (b) these violations had been of special 
concern in America because the lack of a centralized government authorized to provide 
judicial remedies for these violations had given rise to foreign relations concerns in the 
period following independence through the Articles of Confederation, id. at 2756-57 & 
n.11; (c) as a result of this lack of authority and to ameliorate its consequences, the 
Continental Congress twice called on states to enforce rights based on the law of nations; 
(d) the concern over the centralized government’s inability to enforce the law of nations 
persisted in the Constitutional Convention which drafted a Constitution “vesting the 
Supreme Court with original jurisdiction over ‘all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other 
public ministers and Consuls,’” id. at 2757 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2); (e) 
similarly, the first Congress not only enacted the ATS, but also recognized the three 
offenses above as criminal, reinforced the Supreme Court’s “original jurisdiction over 
suits brought by diplomats,” and authorized alienage jurisdiction, id. at 2757, 2758; (f) the 
presumed principal drafter of the ATS had both been in the Continental Congress that first 
called for state enforcement of the law of nations and been in the one state legislature that 
responded to the call; id. at 2756-58; (g) the Attorney General in 1795 opined that the 
ATS opened the federal courts to a tort suit, presumably based on common law causes of 
action, “against Americans who had taken part in the French plunder of a British slave 
colony in Sierra Leonne,” id. at 2759; and (h) a district court decision from the same year 
suggested that some torts in violation of the law of nations fell within the common law 
and were subject to ATS jurisdiction, while a district court decision in 1793 held that the 
ATS could not provide jurisdiction for a suit not based on tort only, but did not suggest 
that additional legislation would be necessary to confer jurisdiction in a suit seeking only 
tort recovery, id. Some have criticized the Court’s historical evidence as very weak.  Ku 
& Yoo, supra note †, at 171. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ See Stephens, supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 999 (“It seems . . . clear that, 
during the late eighteenth century, members of Congress would not have seen any need to 
explicitly create a cause of action for international law violations because they understood 
that such claims could be based on common law.”). 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§ See supra note §§§§§§§ and accompanying text. 
************** See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2765. 
†††††††††††††† Id.; see also Stephens, supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 999 (noting that the Court 
in Sosa tried to effectuate the intent of the first Congress despite intervening changes in 
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More recent Congresses, like the first Congress, have implied an 
intent to allow federal courts to recognize limited causes of action that fit 
within the ATS’s jurisdictional grant.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Federal courts have 
assumed the authority to recognize causes of action based on the law of 
nations since 1980, when the Second Circuit in Filartiga first sustained an 
ATS suit grounded in the CIL prohibition on official torture.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ 
Judicial disagreement with the Second Circuit’s position was joined in 
1984 when Judge Bork, in the D.C. Circuit’s fractured opinion in Tel-Oren 
v. Libyan Arab Republic, concluded that the ATS was a jurisdictional 
statute and did not create a cause of action.*************** In the two 
decades since these opinions, Congress has never expressed disagreement 
with the decisions arising from Filartiga.††††††††††††††† Instead, in the wake 
of the D.C. Circuit’s dismissal of the ATS suit in Tel-Oren, Congress 
enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA),‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ which 
explicitly created federal causes of action for extrajudicial killing and 
torture.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ The legislative history to the TVPA states that the 
ATS “should ‘remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that 
already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary 
international law.’”**************** 
While this history suggests that modern Congresses intended to 
allow some federal common law incorporation of CIL, the Supreme Court 
did not find a “congressional mandate to seek out and define new and 
debatable violations of the law of nations” or that modern Congresses had 
provided affirmative encouragement of “greater judicial creativity” in 
incorporating CIL.†††††††††††††††† Indeed, the Court noted that in spite of 
the encouraging statement in the TVPA’s legislative history, “Congress as 
a body has done nothing to promote” ATS suits based on CIL norms 
 
our legal system). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2765. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Id.; see supra note **. 
*************** Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2765; Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 810, 811 (Bork, J., 
concurring). But cf. id. at 811, 813-816 & n.22 (suggesting that Congress in enacting the 
ATS may have recognized that the three paradigm offenses discussed in Sosa carried 
“with them a private cause of action for which” the ATS provided federal jurisdiction). 
††††††††††††††† Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2765. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 
(1992), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (1999). 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2763. 
**************** Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1, at 3 (1991)). 
†††††††††††††††† Id. 
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beyond the prohibitions on torture and extrajudicial killings.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
Moreover, the Senate has several times “expressly declined to give the 
federal courts the task of interpreting and applying international human 
rights law, as when” it ratified the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights subject to a declaration “that the substantive provisions of 
the document were not self-executing.”§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ 
The Court welcomed further guidance from Congress, recognizing 
that Congress could entirely prohibit federal courts from incorporating 
CIL as federal common law “(explicitly or implicitly by treaties or statutes 
that occupy the field) just as [Congress could] modify or cancel any 
judicial decision so far as it rests on recognizing an international norm as 
such.”***************** However, the Court had to decide Sosa based on the 
evidence of congressional intent before it.  Given the available evidence of 
the first and modern Congresses’ intent, the Court held that federal courts 
could continue to recognize limited CIL-based causes of action that 
coincide with the ATS’s jurisdictional grant.††††††††††††††††† 
The broader and more critical point, however, is that the Court 
required a finding of congressional intent before permitting the common 
law incorporation of CIL.  Sosa thus stands for the proposition that, as a 
 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Id. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Id.; see also id. at 2774 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). 
***************** Id. at 2765. 
††††††††††††††††† See id. at 2754 (Based on the first Congress’ “limited, implicit 
sanction” of federal courts’ authority “to entertain the handful of international law cum 
common law claims understood in 1789,” the Court found little legislative authority to 
recognize broader common law causes of action now.); id. at 2761-63.  Cf. Charles W. 
Brower, II, Calling All NGOs: A Discussion of the Continuing Vitality of the Alien Tort 
Statute as a Tool in the Fight for International Human Rights in the Wake of Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 929, 941-42, 944, 946-48 (2005) (acknowledging 
that the Sosa Court found congressional authorization to recognize CIL-based causes of 
action, while arguing that Congress’ authorization was broader than what the Court 
actually found). 
 As the Sosa opinion illustrates, “[i]t may not always be easy to determine 
whether the political branches have authorized the development of a federal common law 
rule concerning CIL.”  Bradley & Goldsmith, CIL as Federal Common Law, supra note 
†, at 869.  Congress, of course, may provide clarity by expressly enacting causes of 
action based on CIL, as it did in the TVPA, rather than merely delegating authority to do 
so. See supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ and accompanying text; Kathleen Kim & Kusia 
Hreshchyshyn, Human Trafficking Private Right of Action: Civil Rights for Trafficked 
Persons in the United States, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J.1, 33-34 (2004) (Congress’ 
creation of a private right of action for victims of human trafficking eliminates concerns 
raised by Sosa.).   
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rule, congressional intent is the touchstone of federal judicial authority to 
apply CIL as federal law,‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ just as the intent of the political 
branches is the touchstone of judicial authority to apply a treaty as federal 
law.  Moreover, as with self-execution, other considerations besides 
evidence directly probative of congressional intent bear on the courts’ 
authority to incorporate CIL.  The Court in Sosa identified several such 
factors. 
 
B.  Specific Definition and Mutuality 
In obvious parallel to self-execution analysis, the first two factors 
the Court identified were specific definition and mutuality.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ 
The Court held “that federal courts should not recognize private claims 
under federal common law for violations of any international law norm 
with less definite content[, i.e., specific definition,] and acceptance among 
civilized nations[, i.e., mutuality,] than the historical paradigms familiar 
when [the ATS] was enacted”: offenses against ambassadors, violation of 
safe conduct, and piracy.****************** These specificity and mutuality 
requirements proved fatal to Alvarez’s ATS claim.†††††††††††††††††† 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Even scholars who would continue to assert that “[r]ecognition and 
enforcement of international law as a matter of federal common law without specific 
legislative authorization does not overstep the proper judicial role” should acknowledge 
that “the existence of the ATS and the history of congressional activity and inactivity in 
relation to the growth of ATS litigation provided at least some legislative countenance to 
the federal common law role” approved in Sosa and limit Sosa’s value as an endorsement 
of federal authority to create CIL-based common law in the absence of congressional 
authorization.  Neuman, Law in Foreign Relations, supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 129; see also id. 
at 132-33, 135, 152.  But cf. Chander, supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 1205-07 (arguing that Sosa 
definitively endorses federal courts’ authority to incorporate CIL as federal common law, 
while acknowledging that Sosa “carefully moors the elaboration of federal common law in 
the authorization of the” ATS); Steinhardt, supra note *, at 2253-55, 2259, 2272-74 
(arguing that Congress authorized creation of CIL-based common law pursuant to the 
ATS, even while asserting that Sosa rejected the minority view that CIL was not federal 
common law); Stephens II, supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 548-50 (to the same effect).  This Part 
has demonstrated that the Sosa Court’s focus on legislative intent was far more than 
empirical happenstance, however.  Congressional intent was central to the Court’s 
assessment of the propriety of common law incorporation. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Although these are separate factors, the Court treated them as 
interlocking requirements, see id. at 2761-62, and they raise common concerns that may 
be addressed together.  Accordingly, I discuss them together in this part. 
****************** Id. at 2765; see also id. at 2761-62.  Cf. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 805-08 
(Bork, J., concurring) (The fact that the international law norms on which plaintiffs relied 
were “anything but clearly defined” or well accepted counseled against recognition of a 
cause of action.). 
†††††††††††††††††† Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766 n.21, 2769 & n.29. 
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Alvarez, according to the Court,‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ relied on “a general 
prohibition of ‘arbitrary’ detention defined as officially sanctioned action 
exceeding positive authorization to detain under the domestic law of some 
government, regardless of the circumstances” of detention.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ 
Alvarez could only demonstrate, however, acceptance of “a norm against 
arbitrary detention . . . at a high level of generality.”******************* To 
the extent the Restatement provided support for a more specific rule–a rule 
against “‘prolonged arbitrary detention’” “‘as a matter of state policy’”–
such a rule would require something more than Alvarez’s “relatively brief 
detention in excess of positive authority” and would not sufficiently 
specify when a policy of prolonged arbitrary detention would render its 
enforcers “enemies of the human race.”††††††††††††††††††† Thus, “the broad 
[norm of CIL] Alvarez advance[d]” was at present “an aspiration” lacking 
the required specificity.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Absent specificity and mutuality, 
the federal courts could not provide a common law remedy.  As with 
treaties, then, specific definition and mutuality served to cabin federal 
courts’ authority to apply CIL as a federal rule of decision. 
 
One might argue that the specific definition and mutuality 
limitations on the federal application of CIL (a) are born of the historical 
context in which the ATS was enacted and (b) only apply to ATS 
claims.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ There is some basis for the former contention, as 
the specificity and mutuality limitations might be seen as emanating from 
Congress’ intent in enacting the ATS.  The paradigm offenses, according 
to the Court, were accepted as part of the law of nations at the time the 
ATS was enacted and were likely the offenses the ATS drafters had in 
mind when providing jurisdiction for torts in violation of the law of 
nations.******************** The first Congress only intended to provide 
federal jurisdiction to hear these three claims or at least a narrow set of 
such claims.†††††††††††††††††††† Modern Congresses have approved of 
federal courts’ recognition of other causes of action but that recognition 
 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Commentators have argued that the Court’s characterization of 
Alvarez’s claim was miserly at best.  See Steinhardt, supra note *, at 2253, 2281-82. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2768. 
******************* Id. at 2768. 
††††††††††††††††††† Id. at 2769 (quoting RESTATEMENT, supra note *, § 702). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Id. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ See Steinhardt, supra note *, at 2250 (The three paradigm offenses 
“clearly inform[] the rule of evidence that [governs] future ATS proceedings.”). 
******************** Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2756.  
†††††††††††††††††††† Id. at 2759. 
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has been subject to limiting standards consistent with those the Sosa Court 
adopted.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Thus, one might conclude that the specificity 
and mutuality standards that Sosa imposed, as informed by the paradigm 
offenses, were simply mandated by congressional intent.  To the extent 
that is true, the Court’s adoption of these standards is a further 
manifestation that congressional intent is the touchstone of CIL 
incorporation. 
 
However, congressional intent is only part of the story behind the 
Supreme Court’s imposition of the specific definition and mutuality 
considerations.  Indeed, had the Supreme Court felt obliged to impose 
limitations solely to respect the intent of (at least the first) Congress, the 
Court presumably would have permitted recognition only of causes of 
action in situations where a failure to do so would strain U.S. relations 
with other countries (again with the three specified offenses as 
paradigms),§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ for it was the national government’s inability 
to respond to international law violations damaging foreign relations that 
motivated enactment of the ATS.********************* But the specificity and 
mutuality standards do not derive solely from the ATS.  They are part of a 
broader analysis that applies to the incorporation question generally, as is 
evidenced by the fact that these standards (a) derive from separation of 
powers concerns that are independent from the ATS and (b) serve to 
 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Id. at 2765-66; see id. at 2774-76 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) 
(criticizing the Court for using the same standards that “ambitious lower courts have 
used”); Stephens II, supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 534-35, 551-55 (The tone and standard adopted 
by Sosa mirror the approach of Filartiga and most of its progeny.); Steinhardt, supra note 
*, at 2245, 2250-51 (asserting that the limitations imposed by the Sosa Court were 
consistent with those employed by lower courts); Brower, supra note ††††††††††††††††, 
at 939 (“The rule stated in Sosa is essentially no different than the rule stated in Filartiga 
over twenty years prior.”); Dodge, supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 87, 94 (“[T]he restraint imposed 
by the Sosa Court, was no more than the lower courts had already been exercising in cases 
under the ATS.”).  Cf. Brav, Recent Development, supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 266, 272 
(arguing that Sosa endorsed “a slightly more restricted version of Filartiga”). 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ See Ku & Yoo, supra note †, at 178 (“While [the Sosa Court] looked to 
the diplomatic problem that had beset the national government under the Articles of 
Confederation, [the Court] rejected the idea that the ATS should be so limited” and, 
indeed, transformed the purpose of the ATS “from keeping the United States out of 
diplomatic incidents to keeping other nations to their international obligations.”).  But cf. 
Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 
876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585, 604 (1980) (When “there is 
a consensus in the international community that [a] . . . right is protected and that there is a 
widely shared understanding of the scope of this protection. . . . there is little danger that 
judicial enforcement will impair our foreign policy efforts.”). 
********************* See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2756-59; Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 812, 816 (Bork., 
J., concurring). 
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address those concerns whenever common law incorporation is at issue. 
 
The specificity and mutuality considerations arose, not only from 
the history of the ATS, but from the Supreme Court’s concern, rather 
extensively detailed in its opinion, for maintaining fidelity to the post-Erie 
distribution of law-making authority between Congress and the federal 
courts.††††††††††††††††††††† Indeed, the Supreme Court decided against 
Alvarez precisely because “[c]reating a private cause of action to further 
[the broad norm Alvarez advanced] would go beyond any common law 
discretion [the Court] thought it appropriate to exercise.”‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
In addition, the Court explained that Erie concerns provided “good 
reasons” for restraining “the discretion a federal court . . . exercise[s] in 
considering a new cause of action” based on CIL.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Those 
concerns, which arise whenever CIL is incorporated as federal common 
law, are met by the specific definition and mutuality 
requirements.********************** 
At a basic level, specific definition and mutuality serve to ensure 
that federal courts do not incorporate norms that have not yet qualified as 
CIL.†††††††††††††††††††††† But these requirements do more than that; they 
also serve to limit the discretion courts may exercise even when the 
traditional definition of CIL is arguably satisfied.  CIL results from the 
 
††††††††††††††††††††† See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761-63.  While the Sosa Court focused on the 
proper distribution of federal law-making authority, the specificity and mutuality concerns 
also serve to police the distribution of foreign affairs authority among the federal 
branches.  See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (“[T]he 
greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of 
international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding 
it, since courts can then focus on the application of an agreed principle . . . rather than on 
the sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national interest or 
with international justice.”). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2769; see also id. at 2769 n.29 (Lack of specificity 
is a clear “point against the creation by judges of a private cause of action to enforce the 
aspiration behind the rule claimed.”); id. at 2766 n.21 (Specific definition requirement is 
dispositive of Alvarez’s claim.). 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Id. at 2761. 
********************** See id. at 2761-62. 
†††††††††††††††††††††† See id. at 2769 n.29 (Lack of specificity “is evidence against [a norm’s] 
status as binding law.”); Steinhardt, supra note *, at 2267, 2274 (“[T]he ‘specific, 
universal, and obligatory’ standard enables courts to distinguish genuinely customary 
norms from merely idiosyncratic or aspirational norms”); Neuman, Law in Foreign 
Relations, supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 131 (The limitations imposed by Sosa, including the 
specificity requirement, suggest that “federal courts should be followers, not leaders, in 
the development of [CIL].”). 
An Emerging Uniformity 41
“general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of 
legal obligation.”‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ The inherent difficulty of identifying 
norms that satisfy this definition leaves room for significant discretion in 
identifying CIL norms.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Requiring widespread 
acceptance of specifically defined norms reduces the scope of that 
discretion.*********************** Specific definition helps to ensure that the 
norms courts incorporate provide judicially enforceable standards rather 
than allow courts to fill abstract principles with their own content.  
Similarly, mutuality ensures that courts do not take the lead in enforcing 
norms that as yet remain under-recognized by other states.  Certainly there 
are situations where the United States should endorse as CIL and adopt as 
domestic law standards that have not yet achieved extensive acceptance 
internationally.  But the decision to bind the U.S. without mutuality of 
commitment from other states is a judgment best left to the political 
branches.††††††††††††††††††††††† As with treaties, it is less controversial for a 
 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡RESTATEMENT, supra note *, § 102(2). 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, CIL as Federal Common Law, supra 
note †, at 854-55 (rejecting the notion “that judges ‘find’ rather than ‘make’ CIL,” given 
“CIL’s ‘soft, indeterminate character’”) (quoting LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
POLITICS & VALUES 29 (1995)); Swaine, supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 1526-28 & n.134 (“Those 
assigned to construe [CIL] have so many sources from which to draw, and so few 
constraints, that the task of discovery and application is hard to distinguish from 
lawmaking.”); Ku & Yoo, supra note †, at 184-86 (detailing numerous difficulties in 
identifying CIL); Steinhardt, supra note *, at 2245, 2251, 2264 (describing the process by 
which courts identify CIL as “irreducibly impressionistic” and “inherently discretionary”); 
Young I, supra note *, at 385-91, 396-98 (discussing concerns with CIL that undercut the 
notion that judges merely discern established norms of CIL); J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight 
of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 451, 459 (2000) (arguing, inter 
alia, that CIL is “a matter of taste,” a servant of “many masters because its elements, state 
practice and opinio juris, have no ascertainable meaning and are routinely ignored”).  Tel-
Oren, 726 F.2d at 781 (Edwards, J., concurring) (recognizing the “awesome duty” placed 
on federal courts attempting “to derive from an amorphous entity–i.e., the ‘law of 
nations’–standards of liability applicable in concrete situations”).  But cf. Chander, supra 
note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 1209 (arguing that the judiciary is the branch of government best suited to 
“review the difficult plethora of legal materials that constitute international law”); Koh, 
supra note †, at 1853 (arguing that when federal courts make common law based on CIL 
they “exercise less judicial discretion than when making other kinds of federal common 
law, as their task is not to create rules willy-nilly, but rather to discern rules of decision 
from an existing corpus of [CIL] rules”). 
*********************** These requirements would, as one example, prevent courts 
from applying a norm of CIL to an innovative defendant without assurance that such 
application had become well-accepted in CIL.  See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766 & n.20. 
††††††††††††††††††††††† Cf. Note, The Offenses Clause, supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 2391-92, 
2395-98 (arguing that Congress, under the Offenses Clauses, possesses legislative 
authority to incorporate norms of CIL that fall short of the specificity and mutuality 
required for common law incorporation). 
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court to bind the United States to international norms that have been 
mutually recognized as obligatory by a broad number of other 
states.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
In short, the specificity and mutuality considerations the Supreme 
Court adopted are not exclusive to ATS litigation.  While they are critical 
to ATS litigation and were key to resolving Alvarez’s ATS claim, the 
reason the Court imposed them and their general utility suggest that they 
are intended to guide incorporation of CIL by a federal court whether 
pursuant to the ATS or otherwise. 
 
The specificity and mutuality considerations imposed on CIL 
incorporation mirror the considerations involved in self-execution 
analysis.  Morever, as in self-execution analysis, specificity and mutuality 
were not the only considerations the Court adopted to guide incorporation 
of CIL.  Because specificity and mutuality concerns were sufficient to 
dispose of Alvarez’s claim, the Sosa Court did not discuss these other 
cnsiderations in great detail, but did identify them and gave some sense of 
their content.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ 
B.  Practical Consequences 
The Court held that in deciding whether it is appropriate to 
incorporate CIL as federal common law--as in deciding whether to apply a 
treaty as self-executing--federal courts must consider the practical 
consequences of doing so.************************ Indeed, the Sosa Court 
 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Cf. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 888 (“It is only where the nations of 
the world have demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual, and not merely several, concern, 
by means of express international accords, that a wrong generally recognized becomes an 
international law violation within the meaning of the [ATS].”). 
 This is not to suggest that courts may incorporate all CIL norms that have 
reached a certain level of specificity and acceptance.  Courts’ incorporation authority still 
depends on congressional intent and the other considerations detailed in this Part.  But, in 
cases where congressional intent may be implied and other considerations do not militate 
against incorporation, incorporation would raise fewer separation of powers concerns 
where the norm incorporated is both specifically defined and mutually accepted by a 
large number of states. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766 n.21 (The “requirement of clear 
definition is not meant to be the only principle limiting the availability of relief in the 
federal courts for violations of [CIL], though it disposes of this case.”).  
************************ See id. at 2763, 2766; id. at 2774 (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part).  Cf. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 812 (Bork, J., concurring) (rejecting as “too sweeping” an 
interpretation of the ATS that “would authorize tort suits for the vindication of any 
international legal right”). 
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noted that consideration of practical consequences is inevitable in 
analyzing specificity.†††††††††††††††††††††††† Thus, the Court concluded that 
Alvarez’s claimed norm was insufficiently specific in part because “its 
implications [were] . . . breathtaking.”‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ If the Court 
recognized, as Alvarez urged, a cause of action for “officially sanctioned 
action exceeding positive authorization to detain under the domestic law 
of some government, regardless of the circumstances” attending the 
detention, that cause of action would encompass “any arrest, anywhere in 
the world” that was “unauthorized by the law of the jurisdiction in which 
it took place.”§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ “It would create an action in federal 
courts for arrests by state officers who simply exceed their authority”--
“the reckless policeman who botches his warrant.”************************* It 
would create a claim “for the violation of any limit that the law of any 
country might place on the authority of its own officers to 
arrest.”††††††††††††††††††††††††† And if the cause of action were interpreted to 
cover detentions by non-governmental actors, the consequences would be 
even more far-reaching.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ The expansive consequences 
of incorporating Alvarez’s alleged norm of CIL persuaded the Court that 
such lawmaking by the federal judiciary would be improper. 
 
D.  Foreign Relations Effects 
As in self-execution analysis, one practical consequence plays a 
particular role in CIL incorporation analysis:  The Sosa Court emphasized 
that “the potential implications for the foreign relations of the United 
States of recognizing [private claims for violations of CIL] should make 
courts particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative 
and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs.”§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ 
†††††††††††††††††††††††† Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766 (“[T]he determination whether a norm 
is sufficiently definite to support a cause of action should (and indeed inevitable must) 
involve an element of judgment about the practical consequences of making that cause 
available to litigants in federal courts.”) (footnote omitted).  While the Court in Sosa 
analyzed these practical consequences as a subset of the specific definition requirement, 
practical consequences bears independent weight in the incorporation analysis, as even a 
specifically defined norm might produce consequences that would counsel against 
incorporation absent clearer congressional intent. 
 ‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Id. at 2768. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Id. 
************************* Id. at 2768, 2769. 
††††††††††††††††††††††††† Id. at 2768. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ See id. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Id. at 2763; see also id. at 2774 (Scalia, J., concurring in part); 
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As this statement intimates, CIL incorporation could negatively impact 
U.S. relations with other states, the political branches’ range of discretion 
to conduct foreign affairs, and the distribution of foreign affairs authority 
between the political branches and the judiciary.  Courts should be aware 
of these concerns in deciding whether to incorporate norms of CIL, just as 
courts weigh these concerns in conducting self-execution analysis. 
 
Consistent with this principle, the Sosa Court took specific note of 
the foreign relations impact of incorporating CIL in ATS suits by aliens.  
Incorporation in such suits involves federal courts in identifying limits “on 
the power of foreign governments over their own citizens, and” in holding 
“that a foreign government or its agent has transgressed those 
limits.”************************** Notwithstanding the potential good done by 
these suits, they “raise risks of adverse foreign policy 
consequences.”†††††††††††††††††††††††††† As a result, federal courts should 
undertake these suits, “if at all, with great caution” and sensitivity to their 
foreign relations impact.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
The Sosa Court also indicated that federal courts might have to 
defer to the political branches’ foreign affairs assessment in appropriate 
cases.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ For example, the U.S. executive has agreed 
with the Government of South Africa that ATS class action suits pending 
in the United States against corporations allegedly complicit in apartheid 
interfere with the response to apartheid that South Africa has chosen: an 
approach emphasizing confession and forgiveness rather than judicial 
penalties.*************************** “In such cases, [the Court explained,] 
there is a strong argument that federal courts should give serious weight to 
the Executive Branch’s view of the case’s impact on foreign 
policy.”††††††††††††††††††††††††††† 
While the Court suggested that this deference was a separate 
consideration, it appears simply to be a manifestation of the foreign 
 
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 805 & n. 12, 806 (Bork, J., concurring) (arguing that potential 
negative impact on foreign affairs counseled against both judicial recognition of a private 
cause of action and the existence of a private cause of action under international law). 
************************** Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2763; see also id. at 2774 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part). 
†††††††††††††††††††††††††† Id. at 2763. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Id. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Id. at 2766 n.21. 
*************************** Id. 
††††††††††††††††††††††††††† Id. 
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relations concerns, noted above, that figure into incorporation analysis: in 
particular, the proper distribution of foreign affairs authority between the 
political branches and the courts.  Because the political branches are often 
more competent at assessing foreign relations’ impact and in order to 
preserve the political branches’ authority to conduct foreign affairs as they 
see fit, the court must sometimes defer to those branches’ assessment of 
foreign relations implications and their decisions on whether our foreign 
policy should respond to those implications.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ In the 
South African context, this would mean deferring to the executive’s 
assessment of the impact the litigation would have on our relations with 
South Africa and to the executive’s conclusion that such an impact would 
not be in our interest. 
 
E.  Alternative Enforcement Mechanisms 
In addition to identifying foreign relations considerations as part of 
the incorporation analysis, the Court concluded that federal courts might 
restrict incorporation in cases where international law requires exhaustion 
of remedies in local and perhaps international tribunals before a plaintiff 
raises “a claim in a foreign forum.”§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ On one level, 
respect for an international exhaustion requirement might be a 
manifestation of the specific definition requirement.  That is, courts should 
only recognize claims that are sufficiently specific and then should only 
recognize them as specified.  If a claim is subject to an exhaustion 
requirement in international law, it should not be incorporated without that 
limitation.  On another level, the Court’s solicitude toward an international 
exhaustion requirement manifests an independent consideration in the 
incorporation analysis: the availability of alternative means of 
enforcement.  If CIL claims are capable of enforcement in another forum, 
the federal judiciary would be less justified in incorporating them for 
enforcement in federal courts, just as federal courts would be less justified 
in applying a treaty as self-executing if the treaty contemplated 
enforcement through alternative means. 
 
IV.  UNIFORMITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ But cf. Stephens II, supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 561-67 (suggesting 
that courts must not simply defer to the executive’s foreign affairs assessment when it is 
counterfactual and asserting that “the Sosa opinion makes no mention at all of the 
executive branch’s views of the case or of its overwrought description of the supposed 
danger that ATS cases pose to U.S. foreign policy”). 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766 n.21. 
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As the above discussion acknowledges, the Supreme Court in Sosa 
did not explicitly state that common law incorporation of CIL is governed 
by the same standards as self-execution of treaties.  Indeed, the Court’s 
somewhat scattered identification of the considerations that constrain 
judicial incorporation of CIL suggests that the Court may not have been 
aware that it was prescribing the same factors that have guided self-
execution analysis.  However, even a cursory comparison of the 
considerations involved in self-execution analysis and those imposed by 
Sosa to guide CIL incorporation reveals almost perfect correlation.  In 
both cases, the political branches’ intent is the keystone of the analysis.  
Considerations of specific definition, mutuality, practical consequences, 
foreign relations effects, and alternative enforcement mechanisms also 
factor in.  It appears, then, that the Court has discovered and outlined the 
elements of a uniform doctrine of implied incorporation that applies to 
both sources of international law. 
 
True, there are some differences between the analyses for treaties 
and CIL.  For example, Congress’ intent is paramount in determining 
whether CIL may be incorporated as federal common law, while both 
Congress’ and the executive’s intent are regularly relevant in determining 
whether an international agreement is self-executing.  But this difference 
merely reflects the allocation of U.S. law-making authority with respect to 
the two primary sources of international law.  The Constitution and 
historical practice assign a role to both Congress and the executive in 
fashioning international agreements as federal law,**************************** 
while Congress possesses primary authority to incorporate CIL via federal 
statutes, either under its power to define and punish violations of the law 
of nations or its other legislative powers.†††††††††††††††††††††††††††† 
Consequently, the focus on the intent of one versus both of the political 
branches ultimately is a distinction without a difference. 
 
At heart, the implied incorporation analysis for both treaties and 
CIL serves the same purpose: to safeguard the authority of the political 
branch(es) charged with primary responsibility for enacting federal law 
and conducting foreign affairs.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Thus, whether the 
 
**************************** See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; CARTER ET AL., supra note 
††††††††††, at 209-10. 
†††††††††††††††††††††††††††† See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 8. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761-69; Oetjen v. Central Leather 
Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (stating that the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs is 
constitutionally assigned to the political branches); Vazquez, supra note †††, at 695-96, 
712-15, 717 & n.102, 722-23 (noting the “domestic allocation-of-powers function” of the 
An Emerging Uniformity 47
additional factors that inform implied incorporation are perceived as 
evidence of, or presumptions regarding, Congress’ intent, or simply as 
analytical safeguards to prevent federal courts from overstepping their 
authority, the factors at bottom seek to police the proper distribution of 
power between the federal judiciary and the relevant political 
branches.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ 
Because the motive behind the analysis governing application of 
treaties and CIL in federal courts includes preservation of a proper 
separation of powers, it is not surprising that the Court turned to the same 
considerations in both contexts, even if 
unknowingly.***************************** Indeed, perhaps what is more 
surprising is that the Court did not explicitly acknowledge the parity of 
concerns that underlie judicial application of treaties and CIL and 
expressly adopt the same analysis for both.  What the Court failed to do in 
terms, however, it did in practice, laying the groundwork for recognition 
of a uniform doctrine of incorporation for both treaties and CIL. 
 
The implications of this emerging uniformity are significant.  At a 
basic level, uniformity promises to simplify the status of international law 
 
self-execution doctrine generally, and of specific considerations in the self-execution 
analysis). 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Thus, the Court’s concern for both congressional intent and 
the additional considerations is not merely a schizophrenic attempt to bridge past and 
present, to “give effect to the expectations of the First Congress while also taking 
seriously more modern concerns” of the U.S. legal system, as has been asserted.  Dodge, 
supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 99; see id. at 88-89, 97-100.  Nor are the additional factors 
inconsistent with the concern for intent.  But cf. Vazquez, supra note †††, at 711, 715-16 
(decrying courts’ consideration of factors beyond intent in analyzing self-execution).  
Instead, consideration of the political branches’ intent as well as the other factors 
identified yields a more comprehensive attempt to police the proper separation of powers 
between the political branches and the judiciary. 
 Whether considerations beyond intent might be better assessed under a separate 
doctrinal banner is beyond the scope of this Article.  For one commentator’s views on 
this issue, see id. at 711-12, 714, 722-23; Vazquez II, supra note *********, at 1119-22. 
***************************** These considerations, of course, can lead to different 
conclusions, depending on one’s conception of the appropriate separation of powers.  In 
Sosa, for example, while considerations such as the intent of modern Congresses and the 
potential foreign affairs effect of recognizing a private cause of action led the majority to 
find limited authority to create common law claims based on CIL, those considerations 
convinced Justices Scalia, Rehnquist and Thomas that federal courts lacked that authority 
altogether.  See id. at 2761, 2763-65; id. at 2774 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).  In Justice 
Scalia’s view, the majority’s position was inconsistent with the method “[w]e Americans 
have . . . for making the laws that are over us,” which is the ultimate issue raised by CIL 
incorporation.  Id. at 2776 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). 
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in federal courts.  As noted, international law’s status in federal courts has 
been the subject of much debate and confusion.  Sosa suggests that we 
may be on the eve of greater clarity and simplicity.  Soon, it seems, we 
might speak in terms of the federal status of international law generally, 
rather than the separate status of treaties and CIL, and have resort to a 
uniform doctrine to guide our discussion.  This is not to say that the 
implied incorporation doctrine is fully developed.††††††††††††††††††††††††††††† 
To the contrary, many questions remain,‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ but the 
basic contours of this unifying doctrine have emerged in Sosa.
Perhaps as important, the emerging uniformity suggests that 
academic commentary on the domestic status of international law is 
significantly out of step with Supreme Court jurisprudence.  While 
academic commentators have questioned the self-execution doctrine, the 
Supreme Court not only affirmed that doctrine in 
Sosa§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ but extended its core considerations to CIL.  
In so doing, the Court emphasized Congress’ primacy* in CIL 
incorporation.  As noted above, the crux of the minority position in legal 
scholarship was that federal courts’ authority to apply CIL as common law 
derived from Congress.  While the Supreme Court did not adopt the 
narrow rule that Congress must confer common law making authority 
 
††††††††††††††††††††††††††††† Indeed, the Court in Sosa suggested that additional, but 
unidentified, factors may be relevant in evaluating claims for incorporation of CIL.  See 
Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766 n.21.  The Court, however, rejected the suggestion that whether 
international law recognizes universal jurisdiction over the CIL norm advanced is such a 
factor.  See id. at 2782-83 (Breyer, J., concurring in part). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ For example, the relative weight of the factors guiding implied 
incorporation analysis requires development.  Similarly, the type and amount of evidence 
that will establish congressional intent to authorize common law incorporation is 
uncertain.  The historical and contemporary context of the ATS was sufficient in Sosa.
See id. at 2755-61, 2765.  But would, say, congressional enactment of a private right of 
action for CIL violations in the U.S. provide sufficient proof of intent to authorize a 
common law remedy for similar violations abroad?  See Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note 
††††††††††††††††, at 34 (arguing that, post-Sosa, Congress’ creation of a private right of 
action for persons trafficked to the United States might bolster the chance of a successful 
ATS claim by individuals trafficked outside the United States).  Many such questions 
remain. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ See Steinhardt, supra note *, at 2283 (arguing that the 
Supreme Court’s “decision [in Sosa] to ignore the provisions of the ICCPR because it is 
understood to be self-executing is a careless expansion of a dubious doctrine”). 
* For one commentator’s defense of congressional primacy in incorporating CIL, 
see Mark K. Moller, Old Puzzles, Puzzling Answers: The Alien Tort Statute and Federal 
Common Law in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 209, 210, 216-17, 
222-31. 
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expressly,† the Court did endorse the minority position that federal courts’ 
power to incorporate CIL derives from congressional authorization.  
Similarly, in identifying other considerations to guide the incorporation 
analysis, the Court necessarily rejected the majority position that all CIL 
qualifies as federal common law, or even that all specific and widely 
accepted norms of CIL qualify as federal common law.‡ The Court thus 
rebuffed the majority position on the domestic status of CIL. 
 
The Court undercut scholarly international law commentary in a 
more fundamental sense as well.  Commentators have noted the Supreme 
Court’s inability to develop a coherent jurisprudence with regard to 
international law.  Decades ago, Louis Henkin stated that in the area of 
foreign affairs “the cases are few; the Supreme Court does not build and 
refine steadily case by case; it develops no expertise or experts; [and] the 
justices have no clear philosophies.”§ A similar view has carried forward 
into contemporary assessment of the Supreme Court term in which Sosa 
was decided.  John Setear has argued that the Supreme Court avoided 
recourse to international law in the 2003 term out of a discomfort with 
international law that arises in part from the fact that “[t]he Court does not 
routinely wrestle with international legal issues.”** This Article suggests 
that skepticism about the Court’s ability to develop a coherent approach to 
international law might begin to dissipate, at least with regard to the 
federal status of international law.  The Court has laid the groundwork for 
a coherent doctrine governing the status of treaties and CIL in federal 
courts and the perceived avoidance of international law in Sosa results not 
from discomfort, but from adoption of that doctrine, a doctrine which 
restrains judicial incorporation as a result of separation of powers 
concerns. 
 
That doctrine not only creates a uniform analysis for treaties and 
CIL, it coheres with other domestic tenets of international law.  In U.S. 
law, both treaties and CIL norms are subject to constitutional restraints.†† 
† Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2755 (rejecting, based on “history and practice,” Sosa’s 
argument that “there could be no claim for relief without a further statute expressly 
authorizing adoption of causes of action”). 
‡ See Young I, supra note *, at 457 (“[T]o the extent that post-Filartiga courts 
have applied only a selective subset of customary international norms, those decisions do 
not support the categorical position that all customary norms are federal law.”). 
§ Louis Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 
COLUM. L. REV. 805, 831 (1964). 
** Setear, supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 669. 
†† See RESTATEMENT, supra note *, § 115(3) (for both treaties and CIL); Postal,
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For example, a U.S. court would not apply a treaty provision that was 
inconsistent with the speech protections of the First Amendment.‡‡ The 
doctrine emerging from Sosa emphasizes that not only do the individual 
rights guarantees of the Constitution limit federal court application of 
international law, but the structural provisions of the Constitution do as 
well.§§ The federal courts’ competence to apply treaties and CIL is limited 
by the constitutional separation of powers which vests the political 
branches with primary authority to conduct foreign affairs and to fashion 
domestic law through statute and treaty.  That separation of powers is 
most forcefully protected by the prominence of the political branches’ 
intent in the implied incorporation analysis.  The prominence of the 
political branches’ intent in turn comports with the notion that Congress 
and the executive can, under domestic law, violate CIL,*** and Congress 
can enact legislation that trumps a prior treaty.††† 
Not only does the implied incorporation doctrine cohere with 
international law’s domestic status more generally, but it leads to more 
appropriate treatment of CIL and treaties in federal courts.  The majority 
view that CIL was federal common law applicable by federal courts 
without congressional authorization led to the strange suggestion that 
treaties, which are written; negotiated and approved by the political 
branches; and specifically mentioned in the Constitution as the supreme 
 
589 F.2d at 877 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note §§§§§§§§§, § 141(3), for this 
rule with regard to treaties). 
‡‡ See Vazquez, supra note †††, at 718; see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-18 
(1957). 
§§ See Vazquez, supra note †††, at 695-96, 712-15, 717 & n.102, 722-23 (noting 
the separation of powers function served by various iterations of the self-execution 
doctrine). 
*** See Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453-55 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 
479 U.S. 889 (1986) (holding that Congress and at least high level executive officials may 
act contrary to CIL); Comm. of U.S. Citizens, 859 F.2d at 938-40 (recognizing that 
Congress can enact laws inconsistent with principles of CIL); U.S. v. Georgescu, 723 F. 
Supp. 912, 921 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (same); RESTATEMENT, supra note *, § 115(1)(a), cmt. a, 
Rep.’s Note 3 (noting Congress’ authority to enact laws that conflict with international 
law and acknowledging authority suggesting that the President may also exercise his 
constitutional authority in disregard of international law). 
††† See, e.g., Reid, 354 U.S. at 18 (noting that the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
recognized this last-in-time rule); RESTATEMENT, supra note *, § 115(1)(a), cmt. a, Rep.’s 
Note 1 (setting forth the last-in-time rule); Vazquez, supra note †††, at 696 (noting that, as 
a result of the last-in-time rule, “the legislature ultimately has the power to control the 
judiciary’s role in enforcing even self-executing treaties”).  The President may also be 
able to disregard a treaty “when acting within his constitutional authority.”  
RESTATEMENT, supra note *, § 115 Rep.’s Note 3. 
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law of the land, could only be applied by federal courts if they were self-
executing, while norms of CIL, which are unwritten, amorphous, not 
specifically referenced in the Supremacy Clause, and only indirectly 
controlled by the political branches, were automatically applicable as 
federal common law.‡‡‡ Subjecting CIL norms to the same analysis as 
treaties not only puts the two sources on the same footing doctrinally,§§§ 
but likely means that treaties will qualify for application in federal courts 
more easily than their more nebulous counterpart, CIL.  Whereas evidence 
of congressional authorization to incorporate CIL norms must be sought 
outside these norms, treaties provide their own evidence of political 
branch intent.  As a result, treaties may be more susceptible to application 
by federal courts than norms of CIL under the emerging incorporation 
doctrine. 
 
One final implication of the doctrine arising from Sosa may not 
seem as welcome.  The doctrine might be perceived as hampering efforts 
to incorporate and enforce international law domestically.**** The 
 
‡‡‡ Bradley & Goldsmith, CIL as Federal Common Law, supra note †, at 858-59; 
cf. Moller, supra note *****************************, at 224 (“It would make little 
sense for the Constitution to require agreement between political branches–the executive 
and Senate–to ratify treaties, but to permit the judiciary carte blanche to incorporate the 
customary law of nations domestically, without any assent from either political branch.”). 
§§§ This is true at least as a general rule.  See supra note ***. 
**** Some have perceived Sosa as a set-back for human rights litigation in the United 
States, though the overall evaluation has been mixed.  See Donald J. Kochan, No Longer 
Little Known But Now a Door Ajar: An Overview of the Evolving and Dangerous Role of 
the Alien Tort Statute in Human Rights and International Law Jurisprudence, 8 CHAP. L. 
REV. 103, 104 (2005) (noting mixed evaluations of Sosa); Ochoa, supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 
640 (Sosa “limited the scope of viable ATCA claims,” but preserved “a limited set of 
claims” that aliens may bring); Stephens II, supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 535 (Sosa disappointed 
those who saw federal courts’ role under the ATS as either expansive or improper, but “is 
a clear victory for those . . . who view the statute as a means to hold the most egregious 
perpetrators accountable for the most egregious violations of international law.”); 
Berkowitz, supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 290 (“The Sosa decision was a victory for human rights 
advocates because it affirmed a private enforcement mechanism to encourage foreign 
parties to observe human rights overseas and upheld the existence of a forum for victims 
to confront their abusers,” though Sosa failed to provide a sufficiently detailed and 
administrable standard for identifying common law CIL norms.); Steinhardt, supra note *, 
at 2246 (“[H]uman rights activists may consider [Sosa] a victory in the sense that escaping 
a fire is a victory . . . , but the impact of the decision on future litigation remains a matter 
of reasoned speculation.”); Brower, supra note ††††††††††††††††, at 940 (The limits the 
Supreme Court imposed on judicial discretion to recognize new causes of action will make 
it harder to succeed in ATS litigation.); Stephens, ‡‡‡‡‡‡ , at 995, 1003 (The Sosa 
decision, in which “the Court provided a cautious endorsement of the Filártiga doctrine,” 
“delighted supporters of federal court human rights litigation.”). 
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doctrine is certainly a step (or more) away from the majority position that 
CIL is immediately applicable in federal courts as common law.†††† The 
practical consequences consideration alone suggests that international law 
may be least available through federal courts where advocates feel it is 
most needed: where it would change U.S. practice.  However, the 
perception that the implied incorporation doctrine undercuts international 
law enforcement largely results, it seems, from a reflexive and narrow 
focus on the courts to accomplish goals.  Sosa suggests the need for a 
broader approach.  In addition to pressing claims appropriate for judicial 
incorporation, international law advocates need to turn to Congress and 
treaty negotiators in the executive to translate treaties and custom into 
domestic law.  The effort to do so may yield significant gains as 
incorporation through the political branches serves to distill the charge that 
international law, as well as judicial incorporation, suffer from a 
democratic deficit.‡‡‡‡ 
CONCLUSION 
After decades of debate regarding the status of international law in 
federal courts, a coherent resolution has begun to emerge.  Though 
unacknowledged by the Supreme Court and, prior to this Article, by 
scholars, the recent opinion in Sosa suggests that federal court application 
of the primary sources of international law–treaties and custom–is 
 
†††† This does not mean that support for the implied incorporation doctrine translates 
into opposition to, or distaste for, international law.  Kochan, supra note **, at 109.  The 
implied incorporation doctrine addresses the proper procedure for incorporating 
international law into domestic law, not the value of substantive international laws. 
‡‡‡‡ See Bradley & Goldsmith, CIL as Federal Common Law, supra note †, at 871 
(“In the long run . . . the requirement of political branch authorization may actually 
enhance the enforceability of these norms.  In general, CIL norms incorporated into 
federal statutes possess the virtues of being clearer, more concrete, and more democratic 
than uncodified CIL. These characteristics may alleviate concerns in this country about the 
legitimacy and content of these CIL norms.”); see also id. at 857-58 (discussing the 
incompatibility of treating CIL as federal common law with “American representative 
democracy”); Young I, supra note *, at 398-400 (discussing the argument that 
incorporation of CIL as federal common law is undemocratic both due to the discretion 
involved and the foreign source of CIL); Kochan, supra note **, at 107 (noting the 
democratic deficit in deriving CIL-based common law from nonbinding resolutions and 
international instruments the political branches rejected); Brav, Recent Development, 
supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, at 276 (noting arguments and counter-arguments regarding the 
democratic deficit in judicial incorporation of CIL).  But see Chander, supra note ‡‡‡‡‡‡, 
1203 (invoking the thinking of John Hart Ely to argue that the fluid transnational legal 
process undergirding international law is “a possible buttress[, rather than a rival,] to 
democracy”). 
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governed by a uniform implied incorporation doctrine that assimilates the 
considerations of self-execution.  This development contradicts the 
preponderance of academic wisdom on the subject but yields a relatively 
straightforward symmetry of treatment for treaties and CIL in federal 
courts that does not, like the majority position before it, elevate custom 
over treaties, nor the courts over Congress. 
